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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, the debate over whether health care
professionals should be required to provide services that conflict with
their personal beliefs has focused primarily on pharmacists refusing
to fill prescriptions. 1 According to one media account, during a sixmonth period in 2004 there were approximately 180 reports of pharmacists refusing to dispense routine or emergency oral contraceptives. 2 This controversy, however, extends beyond the pharmacy into
every facet of the heath care system.
Consider the following case: Yvonne Shelton, a staff nurse working in the labor and delivery unit of a public hospital, objected on religious grounds to participating in emergency procedures on preterm
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., The
George Washington University. I am grateful to Susan Ayres, Malinda Seymour, and
Vickie Rainwater for their helpful comments. I also appreciate the invaluable assistance of
my students Kim Donovan and James Johnson.
1. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the
Eroding Moral Marketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 83 (2006); Dennis Rambaud, Note,
Prescription Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse: Examining the Efficacy
of Conscience Laws, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 195 (2006).
2. Editorial, Moralists at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, § 4, at 12.
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patients where survival of the fetus was unlikely. 3 In one situation a
patient in her eighteenth week of pregnancy was “standing in a pool
of blood,” necessitating an emergency cesarean-section delivery. 4
Shelton refused to assist, and eventually another nurse took her
place. 5 The hospital, claiming that Shelton’s refusal delayed the procedure for thirty minutes, informed her she could no longer work in
the labor and delivery section because of the risk to patients. 6 Shelton was offered a transfer to the newborn intensive care unit or the
opportunity to apply for another position. 7 She refused the hospital’s
proposals and, after she was terminated, filed a religious discrimination claim which the court rejected. 8
The role of religion in the delivery of health care, particularly family planning and reproductive health services, has been discussed extensively. 9 The debate over moral refusals in health care appears to
be intensifying for a number of reasons. Society has seen the rapid
expansion of controversial medical technologies such as embryonic
stem cell research, genetic testing, cloning, and in vitro fertilization.
Political controversy erupted over the application before the FDA to
switch Plan B, an emergency contraceptive, from prescription to
nonprescription status. 10 The physician-assisted suicide debate and
the Terri Schiavo case brought renewed attention to end-of-life care
issues. Finally, the growing number and size of religiously controlled
health care institutions 11 and the increase in expression of religious

3. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2000).
4. Id. at 223 n.3.
5. Id. at 223.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 223-24. For further discussion of this case, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon
Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
455 (2001); Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty
and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L.
REV. 625 (2003); Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993); Katherine A. White, Note, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1703 (1999).
10. The FDA recently approved nonprescription status for Plan B. FDA NEWS, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA APPROVES OVER-THE-COUNTER ACCESS FOR PLAN B FOR
WOMEN 18 AND OLDER; PRESCRIPTION REMAINS REQUIRED FOR THOSE 17 AND UNDER (Aug.
24, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2006/new01436.html.
11. Although there are many different religiously affiliated facilities, the Catholic
health care system is the largest non-profit health care provider in the United States and
controls over twelve percent of all hospitals and fifteen percent of all hospital admissions.
In twenty-one states, Catholic hospitals account for more than twenty percent of all hospital admissions. THE CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Jan. 2006), http://www.chausa.org/nr/rdonlyres/68b7c0e5-f9aa-4106-b1827df0fc30a1ca/0/factsheet.pdf.
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faith in public life have contributed to the growing controversy over
providers refusing to render health care services. 12
A recent spate of legislative proposals, commonly known as conscience clauses, have been advanced at both the state and national
levels to address these issues. On the one hand, legislation has been
narrowly directed at certain services, such as emergency contraceptives, to require that pharmacists dispense all legally prescribed
medications. More prevalent, however, is the trend of legislation allowing the free exercise of conscience by health care providers. 13 Support is growing for conscience clauses that give pharmacists the right
to veto a physician’s order, that allow physicians the option to refuse
to discuss relevant treatment options, and that tie the hands of employers when employees refuse to provide required services. Under
current or proposed legislation, these health care professionals cannot be disciplined by their professional boards, sued by their patients, or subjected to employment actions by their employers for
these refusals.
At least fifteen states have either enacted or considered legislation that would permit individuals to refuse to provide a broad array
of health care services. 14 These laws would also give both public and
private entities the right to decline health care to patients or opt out
of paying for health care services. 15 The newer conscience clauses are
not restricted to religious objections. In fact, most proposals grant
health care providers the right to refuse to provide services for any
ethical or moral reason. What is most worrisome, however, is that in
many cases the right of conscientious objection has become a right
without accompanying responsibilities, or what one columnist has
called “conscience without consequence.” 16 Little effort has been
made to achieve a reasonable balance between providers’ and patients’ interests. In most cases, the legislation recognizes an absolute
right to refuse to provide health care, which destroys any equilibrium
12. Also offering insight on this issue is a recent article discussing the impact the
“culture of life” has on federal and state legislation. Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws:
Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 820 (2006) (attributing the controversy over emergency contraception to culture of life advocates).
13. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Pharmacist Conscience Clauses: Laws
and Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/conscienceclauses.htm (listing states
that have passed or considered health care conscience clauses) (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the refusal of health care insurers
or other payers to cover certain services or medications (usually contraceptives). For
treatment of this issue, see Maureen K. Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and
Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento: Towards a New Understanding of
Women’s Health, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 367 (2005); Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741 (2005).
16. Ellen Goodman, Editorial, Dispensing Morality, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A23.
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between these two competing interests. Employees in pharmacies or
health facilities no longer need to demand that employers reasonably
accommodate morally inspired conduct now that a refusal to perform
services is protected by unconditional immunity from any legal, disciplinary, or adverse employment action. 17 Few proposals require
that the provider’s objection to specific services be conveyed to the
patient before general care begins, and there is little recognition of
the burden that an untimely conscientious refusal may have on the
employer or the health care worker’s colleagues. 18
The debate over refusal clauses is often framed as a conflict between a person’s right of access or “entitlement” to certain health
care, such as contraceptives, and a provider’s freedom of conscience.
From a legal perspective, this debate is misplaced. 19 Although patients’ rights have evolved considerably over the past fifty years, the
law is not so expansive as to grant an individual the privilege to insist that a health care provider deliver all desired services. 20 Barring
an agreement between patient and provider or a statute mandating
access, there is no legal duty to treat. Thus, professionals and facilities are generally free to turn away prospective patients or limit the
scope of their services without fear of liability. 21 The question that is
sometimes overlooked is: What set of rules should govern medical
care in an existing patient-provider relationship? A carte blanche
right to refuse continuing care or disclose certain information for
moral reasons ignores the legal and professional obligations health
care providers have to their patients, as well as the remedies for
breach of those obligations available to patients, regulatory boards,
and employers.
This Article addresses the tension between the legal duties of
health care providers to their patients and the right of those providers to refuse care on grounds of conscience. To aid in the analysis,
this Article provides examples of several areas in which conflicts may
arise. The argument offered here is not that rights of conscience have
no place in health care or that collective professional standards always trump personal beliefs. To the contrary, health care providers
should not be compelled to perform acts they find morally repugnant.
To assert, however, that rights of conscience deserve absolute deference is to ignore the fact that, unlike employees in other sectors,
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. Id.
19. There may be valid policy reasons, however, why providers such as pharmacists
should not be allowed to deny patients access to lawful medications, such as contraceptives. See Holly Teliska, Note, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 229 (2005).
20. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
21. Id.
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health care providers, particularly physicians, have well-established
legal and professional duties to their patients. It is one thing to allow
individuals to refuse to participate in isolated procedures that they
oppose on moral grounds, such as abortion. It is another to give
broad immunity to professionals who refuse to give appropriate
treatment or advice to their patients. Admittedly, this is a complex
issue with no easy resolution, as health care providers may face a
conflict between their personal beliefs and professional standards. 22
Accommodating religious or moral beliefs in health professions requires a system that not only protects health care providers from coercion in the exercise of their moral conscience, but also one that ensures patients are not without recourse when treatment to which
they are legally entitled is not provided.
Part II provides a brief background of conscience clauses and an
overview of recent statutes and legislative proposals that expand the
right of providers to refuse a broad spectrum of health care services.
Part III examines whether legislative accommodations designed to
remove a burden on the exercise of religion by providers are constitutionally required. Part III also explores decisions involving religious
refusals of care by health care workers under Title VII and the implications of recognizing nonreligious objections under broad refusal
laws. Part IV discusses potential conflicts that may arise between the
legal duties of health care providers and rights of refusal afforded by
expansive conscience clause legislation. Part V suggests several approaches to challenge refusal laws under the Establishment Clause
and federal and state laws. Part VI concludes with some reflections
on health care rights of conscience and proposes ways that legislators
could reasonably balance the conflicting rights of providers and their
patients, employers, and colleagues.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
The issue of health care providers conscientiously refusing to provide services is not new. Shortly after the decision in Roe v. Wade, 23
Congress passed the Church Amendment, which states that receipt
of federal funds does not obligate health care providers to participate
in abortion procedures if their objection is based on moral or religious

22. This is a question that confronts professionals from many religious and ethical
backgrounds, although it may predominately affect those providers who ascribe to the
Catholic faith. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience
Clauses, and Religious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 222
(2002) (“Roman Catholic physicians serve as paradigm cases for all whose religious beliefs compel them to refuse to participate in certain acts, which are legal and even ‘required’ in their societal roles.”).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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grounds. 24 Almost every state followed the lead of the federal government by enacting legislation allowing physicians, nurses, and
some health care institutions to refuse to participate in or provide
abortions. 25 The Church Amendment and legislation in some states
also allow providers to decline sterilization services. 26
Since 1973, the scope of refusal legislation has greatly expanded.
Although the early conscience clauses focused primarily on abortion,
recent legislation seeks to expand the rights of health care providers
to opt out of almost any health service to which the provider has a
moral objection. For example, at the federal level, Medicaid managed
care organizations, while otherwise prohibited from imposing “gag”
rules on professionals, may decline to provide or cover any counseling
or referral service if the organization “objects to the provision of such
service on moral or religious grounds.” 27 Professionals or other health
care workers who deliver care under the Federal Employees’ Health
Benefits Plan may refuse to discuss treatment options that are inconsistent with their “ethical, moral, or religious beliefs.” 28
Prolific activity on conscience clauses has been generated at the
state level. In some states, legislation is specifically directed toward
a particular service or services, primarily reproductive health care.
For instance, Maine allows private institutions and physicians to refuse to furnish family planning services based on a religious or conscientious objection. 29 In South Dakota, pharmacists may object to
dispensing medication if the pharmacist has “reason to believe” the
medication would be used to cause an abortion or destroy an unborn
child. 30 Arkansas allows medical providers, including physicians and
pharmacists, to refrain from providing not only contraceptive sup-

24. Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(a)-(c) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000)).
25. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH
SERVICES, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf (Oct. 1, 2006) (listing states that allow individuals and institutions to refuse to provide abortion, sterilization, and contraception).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000); see also GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 25.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B)(i ) (2000). Managed care plans refusing coverage
must disclose the restrictions to enrollees either before or during enrollment. Id. States
must also allow enrollees open access to other health care providers willing to provide
the services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23) (2000). Studies have shown, however, that most
women do not receive accurate information about open access for family planning services and many receive incorrect information about their plan’s provisions. See White,
supra note 9, at 1746-47.
28. 48 C.F.R. § 1609.7001(c)(7) (2005).
29. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2004).
30. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004). An unborn child is defined as “an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.” § 22-1-2(50A)
(Supp. 2006). South Dakota also allows pharmacists to refuse to dispense medication that
could be used to cause the death of an individual by “assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy
killing.” § 36-11-70(3).
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plies, but also information about contraceptives. 31 In 2005 and 2006,
bills that would allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions
for all artificial birth control or emergency contraceptives were
proposed in twenty-two states. 32 One of the broadest efforts was in
Minnesota, where a bill would have allowed a pharmacist to refuse
to stock or dispense any medication which the pharmacist found
“morally objectionable.” 33
Targeting not only the beginning but also the end of life, a bill
passed by the Wisconsin legislature in 2005 permitted health care
providers to refuse to participate in medical procedures (including
counseling or referral) involving “sterilization, abortion, destruction
of human embryos or embryo tissue, non-beneficial treatment or experimentation on in vitro embryos, use of fetal tissue, the withdrawal
or withholding of nutrition or hydration from a non-terminally ill
person, 34 and assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.” 35 Governor Doyle vetoed the bill because he concluded it was “unconscionable” to let a “doctor put his or her political beliefs ahead of [a patient’s] medical best interests.” 36 A bill introduced in the New York
legislature sought to protect from malpractice or disciplinary actions
persons who object to providing referrals, assistance, or information
about abortion, life-sustaining medical treatment, assistance in ending life, and contraception or contraceptive devices, including condoms intended to prevent the spread of disease. 37
Other states are pursuing even broader conscience clauses. Mississippi’s refusal law illustrates this trend. 38 In 1977, Illinois became
the first state to enact comprehensive legislation allowing physicians,
health care personnel, and facilities to refuse almost any service on
religious grounds. 39 The issue of whether health rights of conscience
should be extended beyond selected services was a relatively quiescent one, however, until Mississippi enacted its statute in 2004. Mis31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4), -(5) (2005). Colorado, Florida, and Tennessee also
permit physicians and institutions to refuse to provide contraceptive procedures, supplies,
and information. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-102(9) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 381.0051(6)
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001).
32. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 13.
33. Pharmacist Conscience Clause, S.F. 2430, 2005-2006 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2006),
available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S2430.0.html&session=ls84.
The bill died in committee during the legislative session.
34. This would presumably include a person in a persistent vegetative state who is
not terminally ill.
35. A.B. 207, Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/data/AB207.pdf.
36. Letter from Jim Doyle, Governor, State of Wis., to the Wis. State Assembly (Oct.
14, 2005), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=5111.
37. A.B. 9536, State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006). The bill was not enacted by the
end of the 2006 regular session.
38. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to -13 (2005).
39. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 70/1-70/14 (2002).
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sissippi’s legislation was hailed by Governor Haley Barbour as part
of a broad “pro-life agenda.” 40 Yet the law goes beyond abortion, reproductive services, or other controversial treatment by permitting a
health care payer, institution, or provider (which includes almost
every worker in the health care field) 41 to refuse to participate in any
health care service—including referral or counseling—for religious,
moral, or ethical reasons. 42 There is no exception for medical emergencies. 43 “Health care service” is defined very broadly:
“Health care service” means any phase of patient medical care,
treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the following: patient referral, counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or
prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any
other care or treatment rendered by health care providers or
health care institutions. 44

Mississippi’s law grants objecting health care providers complete
immunity from any civil, criminal, or administrative liability or sanction. 45 Health care workers objecting on conscience grounds are also
protected from a wide range of adverse employment actions. 46 There
is no exception allowing an employer to opt out of accommodating
employees because of undue hardship. 47 Indeed, even assigning an
employee to another shift to accommodate the objection is defined as
40. Press Release, Governor Haley Barbour, Governor Haley Barbour Caps Successful Pro-Life Agenda; Signs Four Bills (May 6, 2004), available at
http://www.governorbarbour.com/old/ProLifeAgenda.htm.
41. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (2006) (“ ‘Health care provider’ means any individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service, including, but not
limited to: a physician, physician’s assistant, nurse, nurses’ aide, medical assistant, hospital employee, clinic employee, nursing home employee, pharmacist, pharmacy employee,
researcher, medical or nursing school faculty, student or employee, counselor, social
worker or any professional, paraprofessional, or any other person who furnishes, or assists
in the furnishing of, a health care procedure.”).
42. “Participating in a health care service” means “(t)o counsel, advise, provide, perform, assist in, refer for, admit for purposes of providing, or participate in providing, any
health care service or any form of such service.” Id. § 41-107-3(f).
43. Federal law requires the screening and stabilization of patients with emergency
conditions prior to discharge or transfer. Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). EMTALA preempts any state law in direct conflict.
§ 1395dd(f). However, EMTALA protects only patients who come to a hospital emergency
department. § 1395dd(a). If the patient is admitted to the hospital for treatment, no further duty exists under EMTALA. See Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir.
2002) (en banc); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i) (2005). Mississippi law would seemingly
permit a conscientious refusal of care to an emergent patient outside the confines of a hospital emergency department.
44. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-03(a) (2006).
45. § 41-107-5(2); § 41-107-7(2).
46. § 41-107-5(3).
47. § 41-107-11 (2). Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000),
provides that an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs,
unless the accommodation would constitute an undue hardship.
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a form of unlawful discrimination. 48 Finally, aggrieved persons or
entities may seek civil damages and injunctive relief for violations
of the act. 49
Other states are following Mississippi’s lead. Broad conscience
legislation permitting professionals, institutions, and payers to opt
out of providing or paying for any health care service was introduced during 2005-2007 legislative sessions in Alabama, 50 Arkansas, 51 Michigan, 52 Missouri, 53 New Jersey, 54 South Carolina, 55
South Dakota, 56 Rhode Island, 57 Texas, 58 Vermont, 59 Washington, 60
and West Virginia. 61
48. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(3) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, health
care provider, health care institution, public or private institution, public official, or any
board which certifies competency in medical specialties to discriminate against any health
care provider in any manner based on his or her declining to participate in a health care
service that violates his or her conscience. For purposes of this chapter, discrimination includes, but is not limited to: termination, transfer, refusal of staff privileges, refusal of
board certification, adverse administrative action, demotion, loss of career specialty, reassignment to a different shift, reduction of wages or benefits, refusal to award any grant,
contract, or other program, refusal to provide residency training opportunities, or any
other penalty, disciplinary or retaliatory action.”).
49. § 41-107-11 (2) (providing for treble damages of not less than $5000 and attorney’s fees).
50. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, H.B. 609, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2006),
available at http://alisdb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLogin.asp?SESSION=1033. This
bill was not enacted by the end of the 2006 regular session.
51. Arkansas Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, S.B. 1141, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2005), available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/bills/2005/public/sb1141.pdf.
This bill was not enacted by the end of the 2005 regular session.
52. Conscientious Objector Accommodation Act, H.B 4660, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich.
2007)
available
at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20072008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007-HIB-4660.pdf.
53. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, H.B. 434, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2007), available at http://www.house.mo.gov/bills071/biltxt/intro/HB0434I.htm.
54. A. 2016, 212th Leg., 2006-2007 Sess. (N.J. 2007), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A2500/2016_I1.PDF.
55. H. 3283, Gen. Assemb., 117th Sess. (S.C. 2007), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess117_2007-2008/bills/3283.htm.
56. H.B.
1184,
81st
Leg.
Assemb.
(S.D.
2006),
available
at
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2006/bills/HB1184p.pdf. This bill was not enacted by the
end of the 2006 regular session.
57. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, H. 5274, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2007), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText07/HouseText07/H5274.pdf.
58. S.B.
1016,
79th
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Tex.
2005),
available
at
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/SB01016I.pdf. This bill was not enacted
by the end of the 2005 regular session.
59. An Act Relating to Health Care Rights of Conscience, H. 315, 2006-2007 Legis. Sess.
(Vt. 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008/bills/
intro/H-315.HTM. This bill was not enacted by the end of the 2007 regular session.
60. H.B.
1654,
59th
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Wash.
2005),
available
at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2005-06/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1654.pdf. This bill was
not enacted by the end of the 2006 regular session.
61. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, S.B. 41, 2006 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006),
available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2006_SESSIONS/RS/BILLS/
sb41%20intr.htm. This bill was not enacted by the end of the 2006 regular session.
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A few states have succeeded in curbing health care refusals. In response to several well-publicized refusals to fill prescriptions for contraceptives, Illinois’s governor pushed through an administrative
rule in 2005 to require pharmacies that stock FDA-approved contraceptives to dispense all contraceptives “without delay,” obtain a contraceptive not in stock, or transfer the prescription to another pharmacy. 62 California enacted legislation making it a violation of professional duty, subject to disciplinary action, to obstruct a patient in obtaining a lawful prescription drug and to refuse to fill prescriptions
based on ethical, moral, or religious grounds unless the pharmacist
has previously notified the employer of his or her objection and the
employer can provide a reasonable accommodation of the objection
without undue hardship. 63
Bills aimed at forcing pharmacists to dispense all lawfully prescribed medications have been introduced in Congress. 64 In addition,
legislative proposals directing hospitals to provide information about
and dispense emergency contraceptives on request to sexual assault
victims are pending at the federal level. 65 To date, none of the bills
have emerged from committee in either house.
III. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE
America has a long history of accommodating religious beliefs and
practices. Religious exemptions from state and federal laws are
common, and serve to foster the free exercise of religious beliefs,
practices, and worship. 66 This Part begins with the basic contours of
current law on the scope of accommodations required under the First

62. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) (2006) (defining contraception as any FDAapproved drug or device to prevent pregnancy). During 2005 and 2006, five bills were introduced in the Illinois legislature that would vitiate the 2005 regulation by allowing
pharmacists to refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives. S.B. 2343, H.B. 4230, H.B.
4246, H.B. 4346, H.B. 4786, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2005). In addition, after Illinois
adopted this regulation, lawsuits were brought against the Governor, other state officials,
and Wal-Mart, alleging pharmacists’ rights under the Illinois conscience law were violated.
See Vandersand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-3292 (C.D. Ill. filed July 31, 2007) (denying
Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss pharmacist’s complaint alleging violations of Title VII and the
Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act); Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992,
1005 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (denying state officials’ motion to dismiss pharmacist’s claims).
63. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733(a), -(b)(3) (West 2006).
64. Access to Birth Control Act, S. 1555, H.R. 2596, 110th Cong. (2007); Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005); To Amend the Public Health Service Act with Respect to the Responsibilities of a Pharmacy when a Pharmacist Employed
by the Pharmacy Refuses to Fill a Valid Prescription for a Drug on the Basis of Religious
Beliefs or Moral Convictions, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 1539, 109th Cong. (2005).
65. Best Help for Rape Victims Act, H.R. 3318, 110th Cong. (2007); Compassionate
Assistance for Rape Emergencies Act, S. 1240, H.R. 464, 110th Cong. (2007).
66. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (stating that religious exemptions
might exist in over 2000 statutes).
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Amendment. Discussion of this issue will be brief because it has been
treated in depth elsewhere. 67 Religious accommodations may also be
legislatively mandated, most conspicuously by Title VII. 68 Although
some legislators and commentators have expressed dissatisfaction
with the “de minimis” accommodation standard under Title VII and
have advocated strengthening this test, most health conscience legislation goes further by completely abrogating an employer’s defense of
undue hardship. 69 Recent refusal laws also expand the grounds for
objection to include not only religious beliefs, but any moral or ethical reason. The convergence of these two provisions may mean that
health care workers will not be subject to an adverse employment action for any health care refusal, however detrimental to patients,
employers, and nonobjecting employees.
A. Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise of religion is enshrined in the First Amendment,
and most people are apt to agree that those who call on their faith in
matters of conscience deserve both respect for their beliefs and protection from discrimination. The right to freely exercise religious beliefs is not unlimited, however, and the courts have often made
judgments about the boundaries between private religious conduct
and the public interest or harm to a third party. 70 “Not all burdens on
religion are unconstitutional. . . . The state may justify a limitation
on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest.” 71
The Free Exercise Clause targets discrimination or the burdening
of religion by government. 72 Laws requiring private employers to ac67. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.1245 (1994); Stephen
G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT L. REV. 75 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
68. See discussion infra Part III.B.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (holding
that religious school with racially discriminatory admission policies did not qualify as a
tax-exempt organization under the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 259-60 (1982) (requiring Amish employer to pay social security taxes forbidden by his
faith); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that parents do not have a
right under the free exercise clause to require their children to perform religiously related
jobs in violation of child labor laws).
71. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58 (citations omitted).
72. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at is-
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commodate the religious preferences of their employees are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny, as there is no state action. 73 A legislative accommodation in which individuals or entities are granted
an exemption from state interference benefits religion and is scrutinized not under the Free Exercise Clause, but under the Establishment Clause. 74 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution demands accommodation by the federal government and the
states in very few cases; in most circumstances, special exceptions for
religious practices are a matter of legislative choice. 75 “[T]he Free
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot
do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact
from the government.” 76
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the First Amendment does not require religious exemptions from generally applicable
state laws; it requires only neutrality. 77 States may decline to recogsue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985)
(“As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.”).
73. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to
Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 799-800 (1996) (“A private
employer could implement work rules which limit or even nearly eliminate religious discussion; such private action is not state action and so is not reached by the Constitution.”);
McConnell, supra note 67, at 712 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause does not reach accommodations required of private employers under Title VII).
74. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (upholding the exemption of religious organizations from Title VII in face of Establishment Clause challenge); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 672 (1970) (holding that state property tax exemption for religious facilities did
not violate Establishment Clause); see also infra Part V.A (discussing whether conscience
clauses may be subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause).
75. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (“[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S.
136, 144 (1987) (“This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes
must) accommodate religious practices . . . .”).
76. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also
James. M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable
Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 551 (2004) (“Although discrimination against
religion is subject to strict scrutiny under the Constitution, the failure to make accommodations for religion is subject to no scrutiny so long as a state is acting pursuant to a neutral and generally applicable policy.”); see also McConnell, supra note 67, at 687 (arguing
that accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause are “sometimes” required).
77. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-90 (1990) (rejecting compelling interest test); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531
(“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”). The Smith decision led Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), in an attempt to restore the
compelling interest test in the case of neutral, generally applicable statutes. In City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its
power in enacting the RFRA, thereby invalidating the RFRA as applied to state and local
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nize exceptions for religious practices from generally applicable and
neutral laws when necessary to promote the health and welfare of its
citizens. 78 The Supreme Court has also recognized that although religious beliefs must be absolutely respected, religious conduct may be
circumscribed. 79 Thus, while in some instances legislation allowing
health care workers and organizations to opt out of providing care on
religious grounds may be permissible, such refusal clauses are by no
means constitutionally compelled. 80
Conscience laws may be desirable, for instance, when they protect
health care workers from invidious discrimination. The broader issues concern the costs of conscience laws to the rights of patients,
coworkers, and employers. Denying exemptions where the exercise of
religious liberty may cause harm to a patient’s health or disruption
of care serves the interests of a pluralistic society. 81
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Employers are subject to Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of religion. 82 Employers have a duty to reasonably accommodate
the individual’s religious beliefs, as long as the accommodation does
not impose an “undue hardship.” 83 The Supreme Court has held that
requiring an employer to incur more than “de minimis” cost to accommodate religious belief or conduct is an undue hardship 84 and
governments. Some states have enacted their own RFRAs. See, e.g., Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1998, FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-.05 (2005) (applying compelling interest test).
78. Relying on Smith, several courts have concluded that government health policies
that incidentally burden religious beliefs are not constitutionally infirm. See Montgomery
v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 (W.D. Mich. 1990), aff’d 940 F.2d 661 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding that autopsy of son conducted under state law did not violate the free
exercise rights of mother, who opposed autopsy on religious grounds); Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 84-89 (Cal. 2004) (holding that a law requiring Catholic Charities to include coverage for contraceptives did not violate the First
Amendment); Douglas County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Neb. 2005) (applying rational basis test to statute requiring that infants be tested for metabolic diseases, in light
of parents’ religious objection).
79. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (stating that the freedom
to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act is not); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 166 (1878) (recognizing that although laws “cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices”).
80. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (“But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice
exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required . . . .”).
81. See Clark, supra note 9, at 681 (arguing in favor of an intermediate approach to
exemptions where necessary to prevent harm to third parties).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (2000). Many states have laws similar to Title
VII. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2005).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
84. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) (“It would be
anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive them
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that an employer’s duty under Title VII is satisfied when it offers a
reasonable accommodation to the employee. 85 A number of cases involving health care workers under Title VII demonstrate the delicate balancing test courts employ in weighing the business requirements of employers and the employee’s right to refuse services on religious grounds.
In Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, the plaintiff, a staff
pharmacist, initially refused to work on the Sabbath. 86 After the hospital accommodated his request by trading Saturday shifts with
other pharmacists, the plaintiff sought other days off for religious
holidays. 87 Eventually, the plaintiff was told the hospital would approve scheduling changes plaintiff made directly with the other
pharmacists. 88 He was unable to trade schedules for several religious
holidays and failed to appear for work. 89 After his discharge, plaintiff
sued the hospital for religious discrimination. 90 The court upheld the
termination because the employer had attempted reasonable accommodation of plaintiff’s religious beliefs and plaintiff’s actions had resulted in disruption of work routines, increased workload for the
other pharmacists, and lowering of morale. 91 Further accommodating
plaintiff, by hiring another pharmacist or ordering pharmacists to trade
shifts, the court held, would create an undue hardship on both the hospital and the plaintiff’s coworkers and increase the risk to patients. 92
Similarly, where a pharmacist who was an Orthodox Jew objected
to selling condoms, the court suggested it would be an undue burden
for the pharmacy to hire an additional pharmacist. 93 Because the
pharmacy had offered its employee no accommodation, however, it
failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that alternative accommodations proposed by the plaintiff would constitute an undue hardship. 94 For instance, the court rejected as speculative the defendant’s
suggestion that asking customers to go to another register to pay for the
condoms would cause a loss of customers, goodwill, and revenue.95
A recent case illustrates the conflict that may arise between religious beliefs and a patient’s sexual orientation. The Fifth Circuit reof their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others,
and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.”).
85. Asonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook , 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (“Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory
inquiry is at an end.”).
86. 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 143-44.
90. Id. at 144.
91. Id. at 146-47.
92. Id.
93. Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364-65 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
94. Id. at 1366.
95. Id.
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buffed a marriage and family counselor who refused to counsel homosexual patients about their relationships and who wanted her employer to excuse her from discussing subjects with patients that conflicted with her religion. 96 Her employer contended it was unable to
accommodate plaintiff because its counseling obligations did not exclude certain problems and because it would be difficult to ascertain
specific patient care topics in advance of a counseling session. 97 The
court noted that unlike many Title VII cases, plaintiff was seeking
not merely to rearrange her schedule, but only “to perform those aspects of the position she found acceptable.” 98 The court concluded the
logistic and economic burdens in having other counselors assume a
disproportionate workload or to be available to cover a session in case
a problematic subject came up was an undue hardship. 99
Courts have recognized that health care refusals impose burdens
not only on employers, but also on patients. In Shelton v. University
of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, discussed at the beginning of
this Article, the plaintiff filed suit under Title VII, claiming the hospital failed to accommodate her religious objections to emergency obstetrical procedures she believed were tantamount to abortion. 100 The
court held that the hospital made a good faith attempt to find an acceptable accommodation, which was stymied by the nurse’s lack of
cooperation. 101 The Third Circuit voiced its concerns about refusal
rights asserted during a medical emergency:
It would seem unremarkable that public protectors such as
police and firefighters must be neutral in providing their
services. We would include public health care providers
among such public protectors. Although we do not interpret
Title VII to require a presumption of undue burden, we believe public trust and confidence requires that a public hospital’s health care practitioners—with professional ethical
obligations to care for the sick and injured—will provide
treatment in time of emergency. 102
Obviously disenchanted with what they believe is a minimal level
of accommodation required of employers under Title VII or similar
state laws, health care workers, politicians, and some commentators

96. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Serv., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2001).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 500.
99. Id. at 501.
100. 223 F.3d 220, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2000). The plaintiff also alleged her rights were violated under the New Jersey Conscience Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:65A-1 to -3 (West
2000). The court held this claim was waived because it was not presented in the lower
court. Id. at 228-29.
101. Id. at 228.
102. Id.
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are seeking greater protection through new legislation. 103 Professor
Lynn Wardle, arguing that Title VII provides only limited safeguards
for the rights of health care employees, 104 has proposed a model statute that prevents employers from taking adverse action against any
individual because of a refusal to “counsel, advise, . . . provide, perform, assist or participate directly or indirectly in providing or performing health services that violate his or her religious or moral convictions.” 105 The suggested statute also allows persons to be excluded
from employment only where the services required are a necessary
and substantial part of the person’s responsibilities and if the person’s
conscience “cannot be reasonably accommodated by diligent effort.” 106
Rather than occupy a middle ground where health care employees
could have been given more security than afforded by Title VII, legislators opted to eliminate the ability of employers to take any action
against those who refuse to perform job-related duties. Under recent
state refusal legislation, employers cannot assert that they will suffer
a substantial economic or logistical hardship in accommodating a
worker’s religious, moral, or ethical objection to providing health care
services. Mississippi law specifically provides that employers may
not use a defense of undue burden in any civil action brought for violation of its conscience protections. 107 Legislators in Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, Missouri, South Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia tracked the language in the Mississippi
statute in their proposals, abrogating a defense of undue hardship
where the employee refuses to provide any health care service on
grounds of conscience. 108 Only Michigan and Texas gave some consideration to the burden on the employer or coworkers. 109
103. In addition to state proposals, there have been efforts in Congress to amend Title
VII to require a heightened level of accommodation by employers. Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 2005, S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005) (defining
undue hardship as an accommodation that would impose “significant difficulty or expense”). A number of commentators have criticized the de minimis accommodation standard under Title VII. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and Religious Liberty, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 21 (2001) (stating that “too little has been required of employers under Title
VII”). Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
575, 609 (2000) (“Overall, the lower courts have interpreted reasonable accommodation in
a narrow manner which, while in line with Supreme Court precedent, is at odds with congressional intent.”).
104. Wardle, supra note 9, at 218.
105. Id. at 228, app. (A Proposal for Comprehensive Conscience Clause Legislation,
Health Care Providers’ Rights to Conscience Protection Act).
106. Id. at 229.
107. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-11(1) (“It shall not be a defense to any claim arising out
of the violation of this chapter that such violation was necessary to prevent additional burden or
expense on any other health care provider, health care institution, individual or patient.”).
108. See supra notes 50, 51, 53-57, 59, 61.
109. Under the Michigan bill, an employer may terminate a health care provider if the
provider objects to a service that constitutes more than ten percent of the provider’s daily
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Thus, in most states where broad conscience clauses are being
considered, health care employers would be hindered not only in hiring or firing an employee, but also in their efforts to accommodate an
employee’s religious, moral, or ethical practices regardless of the cost
or inconvenience to the employer. Reasonable accommodation “furthers the interests of tolerance on the part of both the employee and
the employer”110 and, it can be argued, the interests of other employees
and patients who may be seriously affected by the employee’s beliefs.
The absolute accommodation of an employee’s religious or personal conduct may threaten the safety and health of patients, cause significant
hardship on the employer’s business, and undermine the workplace.
C. Nonreligious Objections
Conscience is defined broadly under Mississippi’s refusal law and
recent state proposals following its path. 111 In addition to religious
grounds for objection, providers may decline to participate in health
care services on moral or ethical grounds. 112 The Mississippi statute
does not restrict moral or ethical principles to theist beliefs or even to
those beliefs “held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.” 113 By defining conscience in this manner, legislators may have
effectively insulated these broad refusal laws from Establishment
Clause challenge, 114 but in so doing have opened the door for protection of a vast array of purely secular, personal beliefs.
On the surface, this does not seem objectionable: why shouldn’t
professionals be able to deny some aspects of treatment based on
personal, nonreligious convictions? A partial answer is that there are
definitional difficulties and practical implications associated with the
terms “moral” or “ethical.” This is not the place to address the many
competing ethical frameworks and perspectives in medicine, but
rather to raise questions about the reach of these laws. The fundaor weekly hours of duty. See H.B. 4660, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3(i), 9(3) (Mich. 2007),
available at http://legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007HIB-4660.pdf. The Texas proposal had a similar termination provision, except that an employee could be terminated only if the health care service involved fifty percent or more of
the provider’s duties. See S.B. 1016, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 172.158 (Tex. 2005), available
at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79r/billtext/pdf/SB01016I.pdf.
110. Jamar, supra note 73, at 792.
111. There are two notable exceptions. The Illinois statute defines conscience narrowly:
“ ‘Conscience’ means a sincerely held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and
relation to God, or which, though not so derived, arises from a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by God among adherents to religious faiths . . . .” 745
ILL. S TAT . ANN.§ 70/3(e). The Washington state proposal adopted the same definition.
See H.B. 1654, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(5) (Wash. 2005), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2005-06/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/1654.pdf.
112. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(h) (defining conscience as “the religious, moral, or ethical
principles held by a health care provider, the health care institution, or health care payer”).
113. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970).
114. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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mental question is whether legislators intend to endorse objections to
care based on ethics arising not only out of religious traditions or
deeply held moral principles, but also those commonly associated
with philosophical principles, professional consensus, or simply personal opinions of what is right and wrong. Without further clarification by legislators or interpretation by the courts, this expansive provision could result in the denial of almost any treatment for reasons
peculiar to the health care professional or facility.
Although religion has been singled out for special treatment under the First Amendment, similar preferences have not, and constitutionally need not, be made for personal, philosophical, or political
objections to assisting or participating in controversial services. 115
Jurists and scholars have grappled with the difficulty of distinguishing between religious and other beliefs, 116 but “[a] purely rational,
philosophical ethical system, regardless of how moral and central to
a person’s life would appear not to meet the definition” 117 of religion
under the Free Exercise Clause.
Under Title VII, “religion” has been broadly construed, with both
courts and the EEOC recognizing observances or beliefs that would
not be considered traditionally religious. 118 The EEOC defines religious practice under Title VII to embrace “all moral or ethical beliefs
115. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981)
(“Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972) (“[T]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief.”). Professor Stanley Ingber notes that the framers of the Constitution recognized the difference between religion and conscience and chose not to include a
right of conscience in the First Amendment. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed
Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 277 (1989); see also Michael W.
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) (“The
very text of the Constitution ‘singles out’ governmental acts respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the exercise of religion for special protections that are not accorded
to any aspect of human life.”).
116. The Supreme Court has not clarified what beliefs qualify as religious for purposes
of Constitutional protection. The Court took a broad view of religion under the conscientious objector statute. See Welsh, 398 U.S at 339-40 (1970) (“What is necessary . . . for a
registrant’s conscientious objection to all war to be ‘religious’ . . . is that this opposition to
war stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and
wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.”). In Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216, the Court narrowed its interpretation of religious belief,
stating that philosophical and personal beliefs are not encompassed by the Religion
Clauses. See also Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (stating
that “purely secular views” do not qualify as religious beliefs). For far more in-depth discussion of the issue than this Article can provide, see Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the
Supreme Court’s Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 581 (1995); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional
Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Ingber, supra note 115.
117. Jamar, supra note 73, at 751 (discussing the Supreme Court’s tests of religion).
118. See generally Donna D. Page, Comment, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. P A . J. L AB . &
EMP. L. 363 (2005).
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as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the
strength of traditional religious views.” 119 Nevertheless, under Title
VII, courts have generally “eschewed equating ethics with religion” 120
and refused to afford legal protection to personal preferences not associated with some religious, albeit nontraditional, tenet. 121
Few courts have confronted purely secular, ethical objections to
health care. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a research physician could not refuse to
work on loperamide, a drug for diarrhea being developed by her employer. 122 The physician was opposed to the drug because it contained
saccharin and she believed her work on the drug violated the Hippocratic Oath. 123 Noting the personal nature of the doctor’s opposition,
the court observed:
Chaos would result if a single doctor engaged in research
were allowed to determine, according to his or her individual
conscience, whether a project should continue. . . . An employee does not have a right to continued employment when
he or she refuses to conduct research simply because it
would contravene his or her personal morals. An employee at
will who refuses to work for an employer in answer to a call
of conscience should recognize that other employees and
their employer might heed a different call. 124
Invoking the Illinois conscience act, a nurse contended she was
fired in retaliation for refusing to evict a bedridden patient. 125 The
court held the statute did not protect the nurse because her concerns
were ethical and not “sincerely held moral convictions . . . arising
from what are traditionally characterized as religious beliefs.” 126
Similarly, a nurse who refused to dialyze a terminally ill person because she believed the treatment to be medically futile and personally wrong was not allowed to use nursing ethics as a defense to her

119. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2005) (adopting the Supreme Court’s definition of religion in
conscientious objector cases).
120. Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513,
517 (1999).
121. See Edwards v. Sch. Bd., 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980), vacated in part
on other grounds, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) (“A religious belief excludes mere personal
preference grounded upon a non-theological basis, such as personal choice deduced from
economic or social ideology.”); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII claim because his “personal religious creed” that cat food
contributed to his well-being did not qualify for protection as a religion).
122. 417 A.2d 505, 513 (N.J. 1980).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 514.
125. Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 1188, 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
126. Id. at 1190. As discussed previously, the Illinois statute confines conscience to religious objections. See supra note 111.
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employment action. 127 The court accepted the hospital’s argument
that “[i]t would be a virtual impossibility to administer a hospital if
each nurse or member of the administration staff refused to carry out
his or her duties based upon a personal private belief concerning the
right to live.” 128
Most conscience clauses also protect institutional conscience. 129
Since Roe, states have allowed both private and public facilities to refuse to provide abortions. 130 Despite this broad right of refusal, some
courts have been reluctant to recognize a secular institution’s conscientious objection. A few years after Roe, the Eighth Circuit held that
Minnesota’s conscience clause allowing hospitals to refuse to perform
abortions did not apply to public hospitals, 131 and the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that the state’s refusal clause did not protect nonsectarian, non-profit hospitals. 132 More recently, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a non-profit hospital, which was not religiously operated or affiliated, was a quasi-public entity and, under the
Alaska Constitution, could not prohibit elective abortions even
though it had a “sincere moral belief” that abortion was wrong. 133
A state may choose, of course, to honor personal moral codes or
secular ethical reasons for denying care. Many states allow health
care providers to refuse on grounds of professional conscience to participate in abortions 134 or the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 135 But these statutes are narrowly tailored and reflect the deep
divisions in society over the morality of these actions. In the latest
conscience clauses, the confluence of the ability to deny any health
care service, the expansive grounds for refusal, and the resulting total immunity raises some disturbing questions. Ethical beliefs essen127. Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 234 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. 1985).
128. Id.
129. For example, the Church Amendment allows hospitals to refuse to offer abortions
and sterilizations. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2000).
130. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 25.
131. Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976). Minnesota Law states
that “[n]o person and no hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion for any reason.” MINN. STAT. § 145.414(a) (2005).
132. Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, 366 A.2d 641, 647 (N.J. 1976). It is important to
note that these cases involved interpretation of state law. They do not grant individuals a
federal constitutional right of access. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
133. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 972 (Alaska 1997)
(finding the state’s conscience clause unconstitutional as applied to a quasi-public hospital). Alaska’s conscience clause states: “Nothing in this section requires a hospital or person to participate in an abortion, nor is a hospital or person liable for refusing to participate in an abortion under this section.” ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (2004).
134. See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician’s
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1275-76 (1993) (stating that most states
allow individuals to refuse to participate in an abortion for any reason).
135. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
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tial to moral or religious traditions are entitled to deference. But
what do we make of a pharmacist who refuses to fill a prescription
for Ritalin? 136 Will society countenance a denial of expensive, “futile”
treatment over a patient’s or family’s objection because the professional has strongly held convictions about the just allocation of
health care resources? 137 If any belief system is accepted, will “every
citizen . . . become a law unto himself?” 138
Further, under these conscience laws, any nonsectarian hospital
or health care payer could refuse to provide services without fear of a
lawsuit as long as it referenced the ethical reasons for its refusal in
its incorporation documents, mission statement or other documents. 139 Under the Mississippi and Illinois statutes, public hospitals
are also entitled to invoke a right of conscience. 140 It is not clear what
“conscience” a public entity may have, and, even from a practical perspective, the ability of these institutions to refuse any health care
service may mean a disruption of essential services, particularly for
those for whom a public hospital is a last resort. 141 A more measured
statute would, at a minimum, restrict exemptions to denominational
institutions. Legislators should heed Chief Justice Burger’s warning
in Wisconsin v. Yoder: “[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters
of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.” 142
IV. RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE AND THE CONFLICT WITH PROFESSIONAL
DUTIES
Although the current debate primarily involves family planning
and reproductive issues, these broad conscience clauses will inevitably lead to more conflicts between patient care and the beliefs of
136. See Tresa Baldas, Fighting Refusal to Treat, “Conscience” Clauses Hit the Courts,
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 7, 2005, at 1 (reporting that a Dallas pharmacist refused to fill a mother’s
prescription for her son’s Ritalin).
137. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination for the
Critically Ill, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 23, 75 (1993) (“There is great danger in confusing the issues
of physiologically futile treatment and allocation of scarce health care resources. The need
for reallocation of health care resources may be an appropriate reason for society to consider whether it is willing to pay for futile treatment for a dying patient but it is not a criterion by which a physician may independently determine that particular treatments for a
dying patient are futile.”).
138. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
139. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(h) (“For purposes of this chapter a health care institution or health care payer’s conscience shall be determined by reference to its existing or
proposed religious, moral or ethical guidelines, mission statement, constitution, bylaws, articles of incorporation, regulations or other relevant documents.”).
140. § 41-107-3(c).
141. Of course, a public hospital may limit its services for financial or other reasons as
deemed appropriate by the governing authorities. Patients do not have a general right to
health care. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
142. 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
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health care providers. Does respecting conscience mean that, based
on religious or ethical teachings, physicians or entities may conscientiously refuse to provide or even mention the availability of common
childhood vaccines, such as rubella or varicella (chicken pox), because the cell lines were originally developed from aborted fetal tissue? 143 Or that a facility may refuse not only to honor a terminally ill
person’s request to have a feeding tube removed, but also refuse to
assist in the transfer of the patient to another caregiver? Or that a
physician may neglect to inform an HIV-infected patient of the need
to use latex condoms to prevent viral transmission? 144 Or that a
pharmacist may decline to refill a prescription for an AIDS drug because the person practices an “immoral” life style? Unless otherwise
precluded by state or federal law, 145 under the expansive conscience
clauses being considered, health care professionals who refuse such
services on moral grounds would be immune from accountability to
their patients or their licensing boards. In preserving an individual
health care provider’s right to make moral and ethical choices, such
legislation allows the professional to violate another kind of ethic:
the duty to the patient.
143. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM,
CONCERNS ABOUT VACCINE CONTAMINATION , http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vacsafe/concerns/
gen/contamination.htm (stating that rubella and varicella vaccines are made from human
cell lines, some of which originated from aborted fetal tissue obtained in the 1960s). In
June 2005, the Vatican’s Pontifical Academy for Life stated that fetal tissue vaccines
should be used only where there is a “significant risk to health” and urged doctors and
families to use conscientious objection, if necessary, to vaccines produced from human
fetal tissue. Pontifical Academy for Life, Moral Reflections On Vaccines Prepared from
Cells Derived from Aborted Human Foetuses (June 5, 2005), available at
http://www.academiavita.org/template.jsp?sez=Documenti&pag=testo/vacc/vacc&lang=english.
144. Although the issue is apparently being revisited, the Catholic Church views the
use of condoms, even as a prophylactic against disease, as a moral wrong because they prevent conception. See Ian Fisher, Ideals Collide as Vatican Rethinks Condom Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A1. A bill introduced in the New York Assembly in 2006 would have
given health care providers the right to refuse to assist, refer, or provide information about
the use of condoms to prevent disease. See A.B. 9536, State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2006). This bill conflicted with guidelines published by the New York Department of
Health, which urge all primary care physicians to advise HIV-infected patients to use condoms to prevent the spread of disease. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH AIDS INST., PRIMARY
CARE APPROACH TO THE HIV-INFECTED INDIVIDUAL 16 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.hivguidelines.org/GuideLine.aspx?pageID=257&guideLineID=13.
145. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination
against a person because of a disability, which includes HIV or AIDS. Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998). However, neither the ADA nor other federal law addresses discrimination due to sexual orientation. Some states bar conscientious refusals to treat based
on sexual orientation. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1 (2005) (prohibiting health care providers from refusing services based on race, color, national origin, ethnicity, sex, religion,
creed, or sexual orientation). Other state proposals conspicuously omit sexual orientation
from the list of prohibited grounds for refusal to treat. See, e.g., Arkansas Health Care
Rights of Conscience Act, S.B. 1141, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005), available
at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/bills/2005/public/sb1141.pdf (providing that a
health care provider may not assert a conscientious objection based on a patient’s race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability).
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A professional’s responsibilities to patients are set out in law and
in ethical and professional guidelines. Of paramount consideration is
the patient’s right to self-determination. While generally affirming a
physician’s privilege to decline to participate in morally objectionable
treatment, Beauchamp and Childers, in their classic text Principles
of Biomedical Ethics, draw the line at conscientious objection where
the service is part of a physician’s general responsibilities and the
patient’s right to self-determination is impaired. 146 “A patient’s right
of autonomy should not be purchased at the price of the physician’s
parallel right. These observations hold for other health professionals
as well.” 147 Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, now serving as chairman of the
President’s Council on Bioethics, observes that while “[t]he moral
values of religious persons transcend the ‘values’ of the profession,” a
provider’s conscience claim is not superior to the patient’s own value
system. 148 “Both the physician and the patient as human beings are
entitled to respect for their personal autonomy. Neither one is empowered to override the other. The protection of freedom of conscience is owed to both.” 149
Legal standards recognize that abandonment of the patient;
breaches of fiduciary duty, including failure to provide information
necessary for the patient to make an informed choice; and failure to
disclose conflicts pertinent to the treatment relationship may serve
as grounds for a malpractice claim. To a certain extent, malpractice
claims are punishment for a breach of trust the patient places in the
health care provider. 150 To safeguard the well-being of the public, licensing authorities may review the practice of those who fail to follow professional guidelines, even where no harm to a particular patient occurs. 151 Conscience clauses may severely restrict the ability of
patients and regulators to seek redress for unprofessional conduct.
A. The Duty to Provide Care
Although the controversy over conscience clauses has been framed
as a dispute between patients’ right to treatment (primarily reproductive services) and health care providers’ right to deny care, 152 access to health care in the United States is not generally a “right.” At
146. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
38 (5th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
147. Id.
148. Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 241.
149. Id.
150. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 491 (2002).
151. See, e.g., In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 838 (N.C. 1990) (“There is no requirement,
however, that every action taken by the Board specifically identify or address a particular
injury or danger to any individual or to the public.”).
152. See Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 139, 153-57 (2006); White, supra note 9, at 1748.
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common law, unless there is a consensual relationship between provider and patient, there is no legal duty to render treatment. 153 Professional codes also support a health care provider’s right to decline a
potential patient for personal or moral reasons. 154 And while courts
have afforded individuals the right to be free from unwarranted government interference into private health matters such as abortion or
the use of contraceptives, there is no federal constitutional right of
access to these (or any other) health care services. 155 In Doe v. Bolton,
decided the same day as Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that
conscience laws, when narrowly tailored, do not conflict with a patient’s constitutional reproductive rights. 156 In striking down portions
of a Georgia abortion statute, the Court wrote:
And the hospital itself is otherwise fully protected. Under [Georgia
law] the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. . . .
Further a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain,
for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the abortion
procedure. These provisions obviously are in the statute in order to
afford appropriate protection to the individual and to the denominational hospital. 157

The right to refuse or limit services to those not already in a relationship with the health care provider is not unlimited, however. The
153. The absence of an obligation to provide health care services is consistent with the
common law rule that, absent a special relationship, no person, even a health care professional, has a duty to come to the aid of a person in distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314 (1965); see also St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1995) (concluding
that a physician may decline to create a physician-patient relationship); Wilmington Gen.
Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 138 (Del. 1961) (stating rule that a private hospital has no
common law duty to accept every patient who desires services).
154. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, Council on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, Opinion
10.05(3)(c) (2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8327.html (stating that physicians, subject to certain exceptions, may a decline a patient when treatment
sought “is incompatible with the physician’s personal, religious, or moral beliefs”).
155. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) (holding that the
due process clause does not confer a right to governmental assistance in procuring an abortion); Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (stating that while government may not
interfere with a woman’s freedom of choice, it need not remove obstacles to the exercise of
that right); Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.
1987) (concluding that there is no general constitutional right to essential medical care and
services). The only exception to this principle may be the right to at least minimal care
guaranteed prisoners and others involuntarily confined. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982) (involuntarily committed mentally retarded individuals); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In addition, some state constitutions may require the provision of
certain health care services. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
156. 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201-02 (1991)
(holding that a prohibition on counseling or referral for abortion as a part of family planning services under Title X does not violate a women’s right to receive the full range of
medical options).
157. Doe, 410 U.S. at 197-98; see also Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 78 (9th
Cir. 1975) (holding that a Catholic hospital was not acting as a state actor under color of
law when it denied a woman a tubal ligation despite the fact that it was the only hospital
in the city where she could secure a sterilization).
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common law “no duty” exception may be altered by contract, statute,
or regulation. For example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act (EMTALA) requires hospitals that participate in the Medicare program to screen and, if an emergency condition is present, to
stabilize persons who come to hospital emergency rooms prior to
their discharge or transfer. 158 Federal statutes also govern refusals to
treat based on race, religion, age, gender, or disability. 159 State laws
may provide protection to other categories of persons. 160 Tax-exempt
facilities are required to provide some level of charitable care to indigent patients to justify their preferred status under federal and state
tax laws. 161
Absent state or federal regulation, however, a health care professional is free to define the parameters of his or her practice and may
refuse to provide services to prospective patients. 162 Facilities, although subject to more regulatory standards, are generally not required to provide specific treatments. Thus, an obstetriciangynecologist may decline to treat a woman who seeks an abortion, a

158. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). Some courts have held that even under the common
law, a private hospital operating an emergency room could not refuse services to patients
who relied on the custom of the hospital to render aid to those in an “unmistakable” emergency condition. Manlove, 174 A.2d. at 140; see also Williams v. Hosp. Auth. of Hall
County, 168 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1969) (holding that public hospitals have a duty to treat patients in need of emergency treatment).
159. See, e.g., Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, color, or national origin by institutions receiving federal financial assistance); Title III of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000b (2000) (banning discrimination on grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin in public facilities); Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2000)
(barring discrimination on the basis of age in programs receiving federal financial assistance); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000) (prohibiting sex discrimination by certain programs receiving federal financial assistance);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (proscribing discrimination against persons who
are disabled).
160. See, e.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2006) (prohibiting
discrimination by all business establishments on grounds of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation).
“Business establishment” includes a physician’s practice. Washington v. Blampin, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 235, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
161. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006). Most states also require health facilities to
provide charitable care to qualify for exemption from state and local taxes. See, e.g., Utah
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 277-78 (Utah 1985) (holding that
hospitals were not entitled to ad valorem property tax exemption because they did not provide a sufficient charitable benefit).
162. Even in light of statutes prohibiting discrimination, a provider is free to refuse to
offer a service as long as the refusal is nondiscriminatory and directed to all persons. See
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91-92 (2004) (stating
that Catholic Charities could have avoided a conflict with state mandate to provide contraceptive coverage by not offering prescription coverage to anyone).
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private hospital may refuse to admit patients for elective sterilizations, and a pharmacy may refuse to stock contraceptives. 163
Assuming that a professional relationship exists, however, certain
obligations are created. Health professionals owe duties to their patients according to accepted standards of care and, in the absence of
a conscience clause, cannot simply refuse to treat or counsel their patients without exposure to liability for abandonment, malpractice
suits, or disciplinary action.
B. Duty of a Pharmacist to Dispense Medication
The law governing the establishment of the traditional patientprovider relationship and the duties attendant to that relationship is
well established. Physicians and hospitals have obligations to those
with whom they enter consensual relationships. The duty of pharmacists to their customers is not as clear. Although a few states have
statutes or regulations requiring pharmacists to fill all lawful prescriptions, 164 most courts have not addressed this issue.
A recent case demonstrates that courts will probably apply the
common law “no duty” rule to pharmacists who do not have a prior
relationship with a customer. In Chiney v. American Drug Stores,
Inc., a customer who was suffering from an acute asthmatic attack
and had run out of Albuterol requested a pharmacist either to provide Albuterol or verify with her doctor or hospital that she was “entitled to” the drug. 165 Because she did not have a prescription, the
pharmacist refused her request, and she was forced to travel by ambulance to a hospital for treatment. 166 Although the plaintiff suffered
damage to her breathing, the court dismissed her negligence claim
because the pharmacist had no legal duty to a potential customer in
the absence of a valid prescription drug order. 167
For the court in Chiney, the key issues were the failure of the customer to present a valid prescription and the fact that there was no
preexisting relationship. 168 Under other circumstances, the result
may have been different. If, for example, the plaintiff had previous
prescriptions for Albuterol filled at the pharmacy, a relationship
might have existed sufficient to impose a duty on the pharmacist to
call the physician to authorize a refill. Once treatment (or the dispensing of medication) has begun, a health care provider may not
163. For example, until 2006, Wal-Mart refused to sell emergency contraceptives. See
infra note 238 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 733(a), -(b)(3) (West 2006); ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) (2005).
165. 21 S.W.3d 14, 15-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
166. Id. at 16.
167. Id. at 18.
168. Id.
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terminate treatment or abandon a patient without either proper notice of withdrawal from the relationship or transfer of care. 169
Where there is no preexisting relationship, a duty to fill a prescription could arise in several ways. First, it could be argued that by
having a monopoly on the distribution of prescription drugs and holding itself out to the public, the pharmacy assumes a duty to fill all
lawful prescriptions. It is doubtful, however, that simply being in
business is sufficient to establish a legal obligation to provide medications to anyone who presents a prescription. The law does not generally impose a duty to provide services to all persons who seek those
services or, by extension, to carry all medications in inventory. 170
A duty to the patient may also arise by virtue of a third-party relationship on which the patient relies for services. Courts have been
willing to impose a duty to treat when the provider has entered a
contract with a hospital or managed care organization that has
agreed to provide services to the patient. 171 If the provider refuses to
provide services to an enrolled patient, the patient may appropriately
allege a violation of the duty to provide care. Similarly, a pharmacy
may contract with a managed care organization or other third party
to fill enrolled patients’ prescriptions, thereby giving rise to a duty to
dispense medications. 172
If a duty to dispense exists, the question remains whether it is
good policy for pharmacists to be able to refuse to fill or transfer prescriptions based on their personal beliefs. Pharmacists often liken
their roles to physicians, who have the right under their professional
codes to opt out of procedures they find morally objectionable. 173 Al169. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text; see also France v. State, 506
N.Y.S.2d 254, (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1986) (finding pharmacist negligent for failing to refill prisoner’s prescription). The France case is unique, and may have little general applicability,
because prisoners are not free to take their prescriptions to another pharmacist.
170. See, e.g., Walling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
(stating the general rule that a private hospital may refuse to accept a patient for elective
care for any (nondiscriminatory) reason). Cf. Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453,
457 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the ADA does not require public accommodations to offer
certain goods, but only to guarantee nondiscriminatory access to goods actually offered).
171. See Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that HMO
subscriber is a third-party beneficiary of HMO’s contracts and physician could not deny existence of physician-patient relationship).
172. In August 2005, the city of Austin, Texas, required Walgreens, the pharmaceutical
contractor for patients enrolled in its medical assistance program, to ensure that all prescriptions, including contraceptives, are filled without discrimination or delay if an individual pharmacist refuses to do so because of personal beliefs. Henry J. Kaiser Family
Found., Daily Women’s Health Policy Report, Contraception & Family Planning: Austin,
Texas, City Council Passes Measure to Require Walgreens to Fill Prescriptions, Including
EC, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=32136 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2007).
173. See Hearing on Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies Before the H. Small
B.C., 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Linda Garrelts MacLean, American Pharmacists
Association) (“Pharmacists, like physicians and nurses, should not be forced to participate

806

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:779

though pharmacists are part of the health care team, there are reasons to question this analogy. Pharmacists do not occupy the same
role that physicians have with their patients. 174 Most pharmacists
are employed by for-profit retail establishments that sell a product to
the public. Although individual pharmacists are licensed professionals who owe a duty of care to patients, their primary responsibilities
lie in using their professional judgment to ensure that the prescription presented by the patient is properly filled and the medication
order is not unlawful, erroneous, unauthorized, or unsafe. 175 Pharmacists do not take a medical history, examine, or diagnose the patient or discuss the indications for the medication with the patient. 176
Most jurisdictions have not imposed on the pharmacist even a common law duty to warn the patient of a medication’s adverse effects;
that duty remains with the physician. 177 Moreover, pharmacists generally lack the information necessary to assess the reasons why a
drug has been prescribed to the patient. 178 A pharmacist cannot discern the patient’s condition by looking solely at a prescription. For
example, many women take contraceptives for medical conditions
unrelated to the prevention of pregnancy. 179
Professional groups have also raised concerns about pharmacists’
refusals to fill valid prescriptions. In 2005, the American Medical Association (AMA) adopted a policy encouraging state legislation to

in
procedures
to
which
they
have
moral
objections.”),
available
at
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=3582&TEMPLA
TE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
174. In a recent article, the authors argue that pharmacists’ responsibilities are constrained by and dependent on the medical profession, and “(u)nlike physicians, pharmacists do not exercise full autonomous control and authority over their area of expertise.” L.
Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown, Refusals by Pharmacists to Dispense Emergency Contraception: A Critique, 107 J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1148, 1148 (2006).
175. See generally David B. Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Responsibilities of Pharmacists: Should “Can” Imply “Ought”?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 439 (1996).
176. Wall & Brown, supra note 174, at 1149.
177. See Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that a majority of courts have not imposed a general duty to warn where the prescription is valid on its face); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055-56
(Wash. 1989) (en banc) (“The pharmacist does not . . . have a duty to question a judgment
made by the physician as to the propriety of a prescription or to warn customers of the
hazardous side effects associated with a drug, either orally or by way of the manufacturer’s
package insert.”). But see Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129,
1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that whether there is breach of a duty to warn by a
pharmacist is a question of fact).
178. See Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May
Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW. ENG. J.
MED. 2008, 2010 (2004); see also McKee, 782 P.2d at 1053 (“[W]ithout benefit of a patient’s
medical history, the pharmacist is not qualified to determine the propriety of a particular
drug regimen.”).
179. Common conditions for which contraceptives are prescribed include abnormal
menses, endometriosis, and acne. See Jeffrey T. Jensen & Leon Speroff, Health Benefits of
Oral Contraceptives, 27 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. CLINICS N. AM., 705, 717 (2000).
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preserve a patient’s ability to acquire prescription drugs. 180 While
supporting the right of pharmacists to decline on moral grounds to
provide medications for services such abortion or contraception, the
American College of Clinical Pharmacy recognizes the ethical responsibility to refer patients to another pharmacist or health care
provider so that patients have access to medications in an “effective,
professional, timely, confidential, and nonjudgmental manner.” 181
The drawbacks to affording pharmacists a right to refuse selectively to dispense medication without accountability for unprofessional conduct can be seen in the widely publicized Noesen case. 182
Amanda Renz requested a refill of an oral contraceptive at a Kmart
Pharmacy where her prescription was on file. 183 Neil Noesen, the
only pharmacist on duty, asked Renz if she intended to use the medication for contraception, and when she replied affirmatively, Noesen
told her he would not refill the prescription because of his religious
objection. 184 Renz needed to begin the first dose of the contraceptive
that day and asked Noesen where she could go to have the prescription filled. 185 Noesen refused to provide this information because he
did not want to help her obtain contraceptives. 186 After her encounter
with Noesen, Renz went to a nearby Wal-Mart to attempt to have her
prescription filled. The Wal-Mart pharmacist was willing to dispense
the drug and called Noesen to request transfer of Renz’s prescription.187
Noesen refused to provide the information necessary for the transfer.188
In April 2005, the Wisconsin State Pharmacy Board reprimanded
Noesen for his unprofessional conduct in failing to inform Renz of her
options to obtain the medication and in refusing to transfer the pre-

180. AM. MED. ASS’N, PRESERVING PATIENTS’ ABILITY TO HAVE LEGALLY VALID
PRESCRIPTIONS
FILLED,
POLICY
D-120.975,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/DIR/D-120.975.HTM&s_t=
D.120.975&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth
=1& (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
181. Am. Coll. of Clinical Pharmacy, Position Statement, Prerogative of a Pharmacist
to Decline to Provide Professional Services Based on Conscience (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.accp.com/position/pos31_200508.pdf; see also AM. PHARM. ASS’N, 2004 ACTION
OF THE APHA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE CLAUSE 6 (2004), available at
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&section=About_APhA1&templ
ate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=225 (supporting the establishment of systems to ensure patient’s access to medication while recognizing pharmacist’s right of
conscientious refusal).
182. In re Noesen, No. LS0310091PHM (State of Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr.
13, 2005), available at http://drl.wi.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Id.
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scription to another pharmacist. 189 The issue before the board was
not about Noesen’s right to exercise his beliefs, but “about following
professional standards in the exercise of one’s conscience.” 190 The
Board’s decision was upheld on appeal to the county circuit court. 191
Had this action occurred in Mississippi after 2004, a pharmacist in
similar circumstances could not have been disciplined because the
statute provides that no health care provider, including a pharmacist,
can be administratively liable for refusing to participate in a health care
service, including patient referral, for reasons of conscience. 192
By offering complete immunity to pharmacists who object to filling or transferring prescriptions, states are not only limiting the prerogatives of state disciplinary boards, but also conferring a benefit on
pharmacists at the expense of the pharmacy or hospital that employs
them. Under state conscience clauses, the owner of the pharmacy
would be unable to fire (or refuse to hire) a pharmacist who objects to
a job-related function. As an employee, a pharmacist has a right under Title VII or comparable state law to request reasonable accommodation of his moral beliefs, but no right to insist on job security
where his or her conduct interferes with essential duties and the employee is unwilling to cooperate with the employer in resolving the
dispute. 193 For instance, if the pharmacy has two pharmacists on
duty at all times, only one of whom has an objection to dispensing
contraceptives, it is possible to accommodate the employee. But if it
is necessary to hire another nonobjecting pharmacist or schedule a
pharmacist already on staff to work additional hours alongside the objecting pharmacist, accommodating the employee’s conduct may constitute an excessive burden on employers and nonobjecting pharmacists. 194
States should be wary of allowing individual pharmacists a blanket exemption to refuse to dispense medication or transfer a pre189. Id. Noesen was ordered to pay $20,000 to cover the costs of the proceedings and to
complete at least six hours of continuing education in pharmacy practice ethics.
190. Id.
191. Noesen v. Wis. Dep’t of Regulation & Licensing Pharmacy Examining Bd., Case
No. 05CV212 (Cir. Ct. Wis. Feb. 3, 2006). This case, however, is not the end of the Noesen
story. In 2006, Noesen brought an unrelated claim in federal court asserting he was unlawfully terminated by a Wal-Mart pharmacy in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985. Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., No. 06-C-071-S, 2006 WL 1529664 (W.D. Wis.
June 1, 2006). Noesen alleged he was fired because “he refused to distribute contraceptives
and that defendants violated his First Amendment rights.” Id. at *1. The court dismissed
the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. Id. at *3. As to the Title VII claim, the court stated: “It is undisputed that plaintiff was not meeting the legitimate expectations of either Wal-Mart or
MSN. He was placing customers [who sought to fill birth control prescriptions] on hold indefinitely and not assisting in-store customers without notifying another pharmacist.” Id. at
*4. Defendants were granted summary judgment on the Title VII claim. Id. The trial court’s
ruling was affirmed on appeal, No. 06-2831, 2007 WL 1302118 (7th Cir. May 2, 2007).
192. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a) to 5(a) (2006).
193. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 84 and 93 and accompanying text.

2007]

HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE

809

scription based on ethical or moral reasons. Rather, a balance should
be struck by accommodating pharmacists’ objections where feasible,
but rejecting the unfettered right to obstruct the delivery to patients
of lawfully prescribed medications. 195
C. Duty to Disclose Information Relevant to the Treatment
Relationship
One of the most striking transformations in health care during
the last fifty years is the concept that patients have a right to information that will enable them to participate in medical decisions. The
duty to disclose may arise out of the fiducial responsibilities of the
physician-patient relationship, the duty to provide informed consent,
or general negligence standards. Conscience laws that allow physicians to refuse to counsel or advise patients threaten this right of
self-determination. 196
1. The Fiduciary Relationship
The relationship between physician and patient is one of trust and
confidence and has been described as a fiduciary relationship. 197 Although there are few cases that hold physicians accountable as fiduciaries, the duty of fidelity is both an ethical ideal and a legal underpinning in informed consent, breach of confidentiality, and conflict of
interest cases. 198 The essence of the fiduciary relationship is trust. 199
As one court has stated, “[t]he patient’s reliance upon the physician
is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms length transactions.” 200 In a physi195. See Cantor & Baum, supra note 178, at 2011-12 (setting out ways in which an accommodation between the needs of the patient and a pharmacist’s moral objection can be
achieved); see also MacLean, supra note 173 (stating that common systems used to accommodate a pharmacist’s refusal to dispense include staffing the pharmacy with a nonobjecting pharmacist or referring a new prescription or transferring a refill prescription to different pharmacy).
196. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(f) (participating in medical care includes, among
other things, to “counsel” or “advise”). The Michigan proposal is a notable exception as it
does not relieve a provider from any duties that exist to inform a patient of the prognosis
or risk of receiving or foregoing treatment, including the availability of a health care service to which the provider objects. H.B. 4660, § 9(2), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2007) available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/
House/pdf/2007-HIB-4660.pdf.
197. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990); Lockett v.
Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note
146, at 312.
198. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 247-48 (1995).
199. See Hall, supra note 150, at 470 (“Trust is the core, defining characteristic of
the doctor-patient relationship—the ‘glue’ that holds the relationship together and
makes it possible.”).
200. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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cian-patient relationship, trust encompasses the realization of two
factors: the professional’s acquisition of power and control over a
vulnerable patient and the patient’s utter dependence on the physician for competent and responsible medical care. 201
The essence of the fiduciary duty requires medical professionals to
put their patients’ interests ahead of all others, including their
own. 202 The AMA recognizes fidelity to patients as a fundamental
ethical principle: “The relationship between patient and physician is
based on trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to
place patients’ welfare above their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.” 203 The ethics manual of the American College of Physicians
provides that a “physician’s primary commitment must always be to
the patient’s welfare and best interests.” 204 Fiduciary relationships
exact loyalty from professionals by curbing practices such as undue
influence or coercion over patients, abuse of the patient’s trust,
breach of confidences, and abandonment. 205
2. Duty to Provide Informed Consent
The legal and ethical duties of a physician to disclose the risks
and benefits of treatment and the alternatives to treatment are well
recognized. Beginning with several notable cases in the 1970s, courts
increasingly rejected the paternalistic view that physicians should
make treatment decisions for patients, recognizing the right of patients to make their own informed choices. 206 The principle of the
right of self determination reached its apex in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he informed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law” and that the logical corollary of the
201. Hall, supra note 150, at 471-72.
202. Few courts have addressed whether other health professionals, such as pharmacists, have a fiduciary duty to their patients. Such claims are usually restricted to instances where the duty to maintain confidential medical information has been breached.
See Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc., 814 A.2d 939, 951-53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding evidence sufficient to establish that hospital breached its fiduciary duty to maintain
the confidentiality of medical records); Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335-37
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (finding that customer stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty where a pharmacy sold confidential medical profiles and prescription information to
another pharmacy).
203. Am. Medical Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Op. 10.015,
The
Patient-Physician
Relationship
(2005),
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-10.015.HTM&&s_t=&
st_p=&nth=1&prev_pol=policyfiles/HnE/E-9.132.HTM&nxt_pol=policyfiles/HnE/E-10.01.HTM&.
204. Am. Coll. of Physicians, Ethics Manual, Fifth Edition, 142 ANN. INTERN. MED.
560, 561 (2005) [hereinafter ACP, Ethics Manual].
205. See Rodwin, supra note 198, at 247-48; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra
note 146, at 313 (stating that abandonment is “an infidelity amounting to disloyalty”).
206. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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individual’s right to make medical decisions extended to refusing lifesustaining treatment. 207
The states are almost evenly divided as to whether the standard
for informed consent is a professional malpractice standard or a patient-oriented standard, but all agree that patient autonomy is the
central focus of the doctrine. 208 If informed consent means anything,
it is that a patient has a legal right to information that can enable
the patient to make an intelligent decision concerning treatment and
the alternatives to treatment. “[I]t is the prerogative of the patient,
not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his
interests seem to lie.” 209 Thus, subject to rare exceptions, patients
control the right to choose a course of treatment appropriate to their
own needs and personal conscience. 210
Basic principles of medical ethics also reflect a consensus among
the health professions that patients are entitled to be informed. The
AMA stresses that “[t]he patient’s right to self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to
enable an intelligent choice.”211 The American College of Physicians recognizes that “[h]owever uncomfortable for the clinician, information that
is essential to and desired by the patient must be disclosed.”212
(a) Genetic or Pregnancy Counseling
Where the medical decision facing the patient is of profound moral
or personal significance, courts have repeatedly stated that the decision to undergo treatment belongs not to the physician or hospital,
but to the patient. For example, the majority of states recognize a
tort claim for “wrongful birth” where a physician negligently fails either to diagnose a genetic defect in the fetus or inform the parents of
the need for or the results of genetic testing, thereby depriving the

207. 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990).
208. See Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (providing in
appendix a summary of state laws on informed consent). A slight majority recognize the
professional standard where a physician is required to disclose the information that a reasonable, prudent physician would disclose. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98,
104 (Ind. 1992). Under the patient-oriented standard, a patient is entitled to be informed of
material information that a reasonable patient would require. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464
F.2d at 787.
209. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781.
210. Courts have recognized several exceptions to the duty to provide informed consent, including emergencies where a patient is incompetent or incapable of giving consent
and circumstances where disclosure would pose a threat of physical or psychological harm
to the patient. Id. at 789.
211. Am. Med. Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Op. 8.08, Informed Consent (2005), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=
resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-8.08.HTM&s_t=8%2C08&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=AMA/
BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=3&.
212. ACP, Ethics Manual, supra note 204, at 563.
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woman of the option of terminating the pregnancy. 213 Damages are
awarded for emotional distress, medical expenses associated with
pregnancy and birth, and, in some states, expenses the parents will
incur from raising an impaired child. 214
In these cases, the issue is not whether the physician has firm
views against abortion or would refuse to perform one; the negligence
is the failure to inform the parents of a possibly disabling condition of
the fetus. Courts have differed in their approach as to the conceptual
basis for the tort. The failure to disclose the need for prenatal testing
or its results may arise either out of the duty to provide informed
consent or from professional standards of care. 215 Regardless of the
legal theory, the thrust of wrongful birth cases is the patient’s right
to adequate information.
For instance, in 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the
parents’ right to be informed about the results of prenatal tests, even
though at that time Texas barred abortions except to save the life of
the mother. 216
The complaint is not that the defendant doctor failed to perform an
abortion or to tell Mrs. Jacobs that she should obtain an abortion
elsewhere. . . . [T]he plaintiffs contend only that the defendant
should have given them information as to Mrs. Jacobs’ condition
and then, with the information she had a right to expect from her
doctor, the decision would have been made by the plaintiffs themselves to terminate the pregnancy.
....
We do not regard the issue before us as requiring our decision of
the public policy either for or against abortion. This is a matter of
very different but very deep feeling. . . . [T]he courts should regard
the question as one to be resolved by the wife and her husband. At
least, the courts should not penalize them for the choice which
these plaintiffs say that they would have made. 217
213. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 142-43, 160 (2005) (stating that more than half of all
jurisdictions have recognized wrongful birth actions). Many states, however, refuse to recognize a “wrongful life” action brought on behalf of the impaired child. Id. at 161; see also
Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 65-66 (S.C. 2004) (discussing the difference between wrongful
birth, wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy actions).
214. Hensel, supra note 213, at 151-52.
215. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Md. 1993) (stating that the duty
to offer or recommend tests is analyzed according to the professional standard of care, not
the doctrine of informed consent); Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 813 (N.J.
1999) (“[T]he informed consent and wrongful birth causes of action are similar in that both
require the physician to disclose those medically accepted risks that a reasonably prudent
patient in the plaintiff’s position would deem material to her decision.”); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing duty rooted in doctrine
of informed consent).
216. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975).
217. Id.
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The principle of reproductive choice is also seen in situations
where a woman seeks to avoid pregnancy, but through a physician’s
negligence, bears a child. In C.S. v. Nielson, 218 a patient underwent a
tubal ligation. After giving birth to a healthy child, she sued the physician for failing to tell her that the procedure was not “absolute in
nature.” 219 The court held that the plaintiff stated a viable claim, recognizing that in a case where the patient seeks medical treatment to
avoid pregnancy altogether, “the pregnancy [of the mother] [i]s a
medical condition that gives rise to compensable damages.” 220 Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court extended this principle to a
duty to warn the mother of the results of genetic testing for Fragile X
syndrome on an existing child, so that she could avoid (through sterilization) conceiving another child with the same genetic disorder. 221
These decisions recognize the duty of health professionals to impart information to their patients as to the likelihood of a future
child being born with a birth defect or other anomaly so that parents
can decide whether to exercise their right to prevent the conception
or birth of a child. This professional duty exists even though the
physician may retain the right to deny care to which the physician
morally objects. 222
The ethical duty to disclose relevant information about
human reproduction to the patient may conflict with the
physician’s personal moral standards on abortion, sterilization, contraception, or other reproductive services. A physician who objects to these services is not obligated to recommend, perform, or prescribe them. As in any other medical
situation, however, the physician has a duty to inform the
patient about care options and alternatives, or refer the patient for such information, so that the patient’s rights are
not constrained. Physicians unable to provide such information should transfer care as long as the health of the patient
is not compromised. 223
Under prevailing law and general medical ethics, physicians are
not free to refuse to tell a person about medical alternatives simply
because they disagree with the choice the patient may make. The
218. 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988).
219. Id. at 505. These cases are known as wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception
cases. See generally Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and
Wrongful Birth in the United States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 535,
583 (1995).
220. Nielson, 767 P.2d at 508.
221. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719 (Minn. 2004).
222. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 455, 491 (stating that the duty to impart material information does not affect the physician’s right to refuse to perform an abortion on religious or moral grounds).
223. ACP, Ethics Manual, supra note 204, at 564.
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duty to inform, grounded as it is in fiduciary principles, also seems
broad enough to encompass a patient’s right to know whether a physician has a personal, moral belief that might affect the physician’s
professional judgment. 224 Even where the concerns of the provider
are sincere, they do not support nondisclosure.225
The ethical dilemma for families in these situations is no less formidable than it is for physicians. 226 The question is who has the
right, given accurate information, to choose a suitable course of action. The recent trend in conscience legislation—from allowing providers to deny particular services that violate their moral or ethical
views to allowing them to refuse to counsel patients about medical
options—deprives patients of their basic right to control their own
treatment. Are we prepared to recognize an exception to standards of
care in this area for providers who view their own moral beliefs as
superior to the woman’s right to make medical decisions based on her
own deeply held personal beliefs? “Conscientious objection implies
the physician’s right not to participate in what she thinks morally
wrong, even if the patient demands it. It does not presume the right
to impose her will or conception of the good on the patient.” 227 The
measures enacted or considered by legislators allowing providers to
refuse to counsel patients on controversial issues are designed to allow providers to retreat from their legal and ethical responsibilities.
(b) Emergency Contraception: Science or Belief?
Contraceptives—and in particular, emergency contraceptives—
have become a new front in the culture war. 228 In this climate, some
politicians and legislators have been persuaded that emergency contraception is a form of abortion or at least a subject to be avoided. In
224. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 274 (1985) (“Decisions made in a climate of conflicting
values or judgments are every bit as consequential to patients as those made when there
are conflicts of interest.”); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483
(Cal. 1990) (stating that a patient has a right to know of a conflicting economic interest
that could affect the physician’s judgment).
225. Dr. Pellegrino, arguing from a Catholic perspective, states that in effecting rights
of conscience, professionals do not have the right to impose their concept of what is good
and that “patients have an uncontested moral right to informed consent and informed refusal.” Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 241-42. However, the directives for Catholic health
care services provide that although “[f]ree and informed consent” is required, a person is
entitled to receive information only about “any reasonable and morally legitimate alternatives.” U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services, Directive 27 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Ethical and Religious Directives] (emphasis added), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml.
226. See Elizabeth Weil, A Wrongful Birth?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, § 6, at 48.
227. Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 242.
228. For an interesting discussion of the political and social underpinnings of the current controversy over contraception, see Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2006, § 6, at 48.
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late 2004, the U.S Department of Justice released a comprehensive
protocol for health care providers dealing with examination and
treatment of sexual assault victims. 229 Although a draft had apparently mentioned pregnancy prophylaxis, 230 the final guidelines omit
any reference to emergency contraception—instead suggesting that
health care providers “discuss treatment options with patients, including reproductive health services.” 231 The failure to mention emergency contraception as one of the services available (and the only one
geared toward preventing pregnancy) created an uproar. 232
States have also targeted emergency contraception. In 2005, Colorado Governor Bill Owens vetoed a bill requiring hospitals to provide
sexual assault victims with information about emergency contraception, on the basis that “it does not provide victims with the full, balanced and detailed array of information they deserve to make this
deeply personal decision about emergency contraception.” 233 The information not being provided to victims, according to Governor
Owens, was that “[o]ne method that is covered by this legislation
would prevent a fertilized egg from imbedding in the uterine wall.” 234
Similarly, in a five-year demonstration project to expand eligibility for family planning services in the Medicaid population, Texas
specifically excluded counseling, education, and the provision of
emergency contraception from the services that would be covered. 235
South Dakota allows pharmacists to refuse to dispense a medication

229. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL
PROTOCOL FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT MEDICAL FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS (2004), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ovw/206554.pdf.
230. See Marie McCullough, Sex-Assault Treatment Guidelines Omit Pill, PHILA. INQ.,
Dec. 31, 2004, at A01.
231. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMAN, supra note 229, at 111.
232. See Letter from ACLU et al. to Jana White, Office of Violence Against Women,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org//reproductiverights/gen/
12743res20050106.html (providing the names of more than 277 signatures of organizations
and individuals who requested amendment to the protocol to include a discussion of emergency contraceptives). Ninety-seven members of Congress also petitioned the Department
to include a reference to emergency contraceptives in its guidelines. Letter from the Congress of the United States to Diane M. Stuart, Director, Office on Violence Against Women,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice
(Jan.
13,
2005),
available
at
http://maloney.house.gov/documents/olddocs/choice/011305DOJ.pdf. The AMA adopted a
policy urging the Justice Department to amend its protocol to include a discussion of emergency contraception for sexual assault victims. House of Delegates, Am. Med. Ass’n, Policy
D-75.996, Emergency Contraception for Sexual Assault Victims (2005), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&p_p=T&&s_t=&st_p=&nth=
1&prev_pol=policyfiles/DIR/D-75.996.HTM&nxt_pol=policyfiles/DIR/D-75.998.HTM&.
233. Letter from Bill Owens, Governor, State of Col., to the Col. House of Representatives
(Apr. 5, 2005), available at http://www.colorado.gov/governor/press/april05/1042.html.
234. Id. In 2007, Governor Owens’ successor signed legislation requiring health care
facilities to provide rape victims with information about the availability of emergency contraception. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-3-110(2) (2007).
235. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.0248(a)(4)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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they believe will be used to cause an abortion. 236 It appears this legislation is directed in part at contraceptives, as pharmacists are currently prohibited by the FDA from dispensing “abortion” drugs such
as mifepristone. 237 Even nonsectarian pharmacies find emergency
contraceptives controversial. Until recently, Wal-Mart, which operates the largest chain of pharmacies in the United States, refused to
stock emergency contraceptives even though it filled prescriptions for
regular birth control pills. 238
There is, however, no reasonable basis for politicians, let alone
medical professionals, to treat emergency contraceptives differently
than “the pill” used by millions of women. Emergency contraceptives
share the same mechanism as regular contraceptives, and the prevalent medical knowledge is that oral contraceptives are not abortifacients. 239 Central to the concept of informed consent is that the information conveyed to the patient be accurate and based on the latest
medical knowledge. The real debate over emergency contraceptives is
a scientific, not a moral debate.
The FDA has approved two emergency contraceptives: Preven in
1998 and Plan B in 1999. 240 The manufacturer of Preven has withdrawn it from the market, leaving Plan B as the only dedicated
emergency contraceptive pharmaceutical sold in the United States. 241
Plan B contains levonorgestrel, a hormone that has been used in
birth control pills for over thirty-five years. 242 Emergency contraceptives, often referred to as “morning-after” pills, do not include mifepristone, known as RU-486, or any other drug that induces an abortion, and they do not interfere with an established pregnancy. 243

236. See supra note 30.
237. Mifepristone, also known as RU-486, is marketed as Mifeprex. Bills allowing
pharmacists to opt out of providing abortion drugs would not include mifepristone because it is not available by prescription. Only physicians may dispense the drug. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., Mifepristone Approval Letter (2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/2000/20687appltr.pdf.
238. Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart to Carry Plan B Emergency Contraception
(Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/1704.aspx.
239. See C TR . FOR D RUG E VALUATION & R ESEARCH , U.S. F OOD & D RUG A DMIN .,
PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/
infopage/planB/planBQandA20060824.htm [hereinafter “P LAN B: QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS”]. Common oral contraceptive pills can also be used as emergency contraceptives by altering the regularly prescribed dose. For example, Planned Parenthood provides
information concerning the brand of pill and dose that can be used as an emergency
contraceptive.
Planned Parenthood, Emergency Contraception, available at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/birth-control-pregnancy/emergency-contraception4363%20.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
240. PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 239.
241. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 10.
242. PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 239.
243. NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 3 (2006), (stating
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Confusion about the role of emergency contraception stems from
the supposition that emergency contraceptives (and even routine
birth control pills) may interfere with implantation of a fertilized egg
in the uterus. 244 Despite a paucity of evidence that emergency contraceptives have such an effect, some scientists and physicians have
postulated that they could alter the endrometrium 245 to provide a
hostile environment to a fertilized egg. 246 Barr Pharmaceuticals,
the manufacturer of Plan B, includes this possible mechanism of
action in its drug pamphlet. 247 To those who believe pregnancy begins with conception, emergency contraceptives, a fortiori, may
cause an early abortion. 248
This view of the role of emergency contraceptives is questionable
for two reasons. First, there is broad medical and scientific consensus
that pregnancy begins with implantation of the blastocyst 249 in the
uterus, not with fertilization. 250 This perspective is apparently
shared by Congress, which, for purposes of penalizing crimes against
pregnant women, defines an unborn child as one “in utero.” 251 Federal agencies also accept this definition of pregnancy. According to
federal regulations governing research on pregnant human subjects,
“[p]regnancy encompasses the period of time from implantation until

that emergency contraception prevents pregnancy and is not the same as an “abortion
pill”), available at http://www.4woman.gov/faq/econtracep.pdf.
244. A recent study of the views of South Dakota pharmacists disclosed that “thirtyseven percent of the surveyed pharmacists did not know that emergency contraceptive pills
and regular oral contraceptive pills have a similar mechanism of action.” Kristi K. Van
Riper & Wendy L. Hellerstedt, Emergency Contraceptive Pills: Dispensing Practices,
Knowledge and Attitudes of South Dakota Pharmacists, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 19, 22 (2005). A 2003 survey of family medicine providers revealed only fifty-six
percent correctly responded that emergency contraception is not an abortifacient. Jennifer
L. Wallace et al., Emergency Contraception: Knowledge and Attitudes of Family Medicine
Providers, 36 FAM. MED. 417, 420 (2004).
245. The endometrium is the lining of the uterus. STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
592 (27th ed. 2000).
246. See Chris Kahlenborn et al., Postfertilization Effect of Hormonal Emergency
Contraception, 36 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 465, 467 (2002) (stating that data support the hypothesis that emergency contraceptives have a postfertilization effect on
the endometrium).
247. PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 1076 (61st ed. 2007) (noting that Plan B acts primarily to prevent ovulation or fertilization, but that it may also inhibit implantation).
248. See Kahlenborn, supra note 246, at 468.
249. A blastocyst is “an early stage of embryo development consisting of the inner cell mass
and a thick cellular enclosure.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 245, at 211.
250. See Paul R. Pentel et al., Hospital-Based Emergency Contraception, Letter, in Reply, 61 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 1771, 1772 (2004) (stating that it is the consensus of
the World Health Organization, the FDA, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Association of Reproductive Health Physicians, the American Public Health
Association, and the AMA that pregnancy begins with implantation).
251. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(d) (West 2006).
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delivery.” 252 On its public website, the FDA states: “Plan B works like
a birth control pill to prevent pregnancy . . . .” 253
The few courts that have weighed in on this issue have taken a
similar position. In a case challenging a Wisconsin law that regulated informed consent practice for abortions, the plaintiffs asserted
that Wisconsin’s definition of abortion was so vague that it would
chill physicians from providing emergency contraception. 254 The court
noted that the source of the controversy lay in the legislature’s failure to define pregnancy. The court resolved this issue by ruling:
Under the standard medical definition, pregnancy does not
begin until the zygote’s implantation in the uterus, approximately six days after conception. However, some doctors, including defendants’ witness, Dr. Nina Kiekhaefer, believe
that pregnancy begins with conception. Plaintiffs assert that
because of the legislature’s failure to define pregnancy, they
do not know whether AB 441 applies to emergency contraception. . . . The only reasonable way to read AB 441 is as
adopting the standard medical definition of pregnancy
rather than the definition espoused by Dr. Kiekhaefer. If the
legislature had chosen to depart from the standard definition, it would have made that choice explicit. There is no
reason to assume that the legislature chose a minority definition when the statutory text gives no indication of such
a decision. 255
Is this mere semantics? 256 Some argue that even if pregnancy
technically does not begin until implantation, human life begins with
fertilization of the egg, and anything that destroys incipient life is an

252. 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (2005).
253. PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 239 (emphasis added).
254. Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1228 (W.D. Wis. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
255. Id. at 1228; see also Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 053672, 2007 WL 2743446, at *14-15 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2007) (rejecting the free exercise claim
of a sixteen year old girl and her parents who contended that the city health department
deceived the teenager when it failed to tell her emergency contraception could prevent implantation of an fertilized ovum). The court noted that the clinic’s statement that emergency contraception prevents pregnancy was accurate and supported by the FDA). Id at
*15; Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 190-91 (E.D. La. 1980) (finding that statute
defining abortion was not vague, despite a contention that it could include two birth control methods, an intrauterine device and emergency contraception); Brownfield v. Daniel
Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a Catholic hospital could not refuse to provide emergency contraceptives to a rape victim under a
statute that allowed conscientious objections to abortion because emergency contraceptives
were not equivalent to an abortion).
256. When fertilization occurs outside the human body, as in in vitro fertilization, it is
evident that pregnancy has not begun. Thus, fertilization and pregnancy cannot be synonymous in all cases.
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abortifacient. 257 Thus, a health care provider should have the right to
refuse to inform patients about emergency contraception according to
the provider’s moral or religious conscience. What recent scientific
research has shown, however, is that even if one believes that human
life begins with a fertilized egg, emergency contraceptives likely do
not have a postfertilization effect.
The precise mechanism of action of emergency contraceptives has
been the subject of much research. Within the past several years,
studies from around the world have concluded that the probable
mode of action of emergency contraceptives, and particularly the
levonorgestrel-only emergency contraceptive (Plan B), is to suppress
or interfere with ovulation, not to prevent implantation. 258 Citing scientific literature, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recently concluded that “[Emergency contraceptives] have not been
shown to cause a postfertilization event—a change in the uterus that
could interfere with implantation of a fertilized egg.” 259 The GAO
noted, however, that the possibility that emergency contraceptives
interfere with implantation cannot be unequivocally ruled out, as it
would be unethical and difficult to perform the research needed to
prove otherwise. 260
The best scientific evidence to date, therefore, is that emergency
contraceptives are not abortifacients. Acceptance of this conclusion
by the regulatory, scientific, and medical communities has broad implications for states enacting conscience clauses and for health care
providers refusing to discuss emergency contraceptives. Although
there is little in science or medicine that is absolutely certain, it
seems fairly straightforward that legislation affecting the health of
257. See Kahlenborn, supra note 246, at 468.
258. See H.B. Croxatto et al, Pituitary-Ovarian Function Following the Standard
Levonorgestrel Emergency Contraceptive Dose or a Single 0.75-mg Dose Given on the Days
Preceding Ovulation, 70 CONTRACEPTION 442, 449 (2004) (stating that “studies support the
notion that [levonorgstrel] prevents pregnancy in women through prefertilization effects”);
Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Lena Marions, Mechanisms of Action of Mifepristone and
Levonorgestrel When Used for Emergency Contraception, 10 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 341,
346 (2004) (concluding that levonorgestrel when used in low doses for emergency contraception primarily acts to block or delay ovulation, but does not prevent implantation); Natalia Novikova, et al., Effectiveness of Levonorgestrel Emergency Contraception Given Before or After Ovulation−A Pilot Study, 75 CONTRACEPTION 112, 116 (2007) (concluding that
current data are consistent with the premise that emergency contraception has “little or no
effect on postovulation events”); Roberto Rivera et al., The Mechanism of Action of Hormonal Contraceptives and Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices, 181 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1263, 1267 (1999) (concluding that there is no scientific evidence supporting
the possibility that emergency contraceptives have an abortifacient effect).
259. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: DECISION
PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 13 (2005) (criticizing the FDA’s
handling of Barr Pharmaceutical’s application to switch Plan B to over-the-counter status),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf.
260. Id.
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large numbers of women should not be based on an unproven (and
apparently unprovable) theory. The issue is not when life begins.
How a drug works is not a matter of conscience, but of science. 261
Even some in the pro-life movement have recognized this distinction and broken ranks with those who consider contraceptives a
form of abortion. 262
The tension between moral refusals to provide information about
treatment alternatives and the patient’s welfare arises most strikingly with sexual assault victims who are deprived of information
about emergency contraception. Surveys have demonstrated that
many women are not generally aware of the availability of emergency contraception and often confuse emergency contraceptives with
the abortion drug, RU-486. 263 In order to exercise their right to make
informed value judgments about treatment alternatives, patients
need to know at a minimum what alternatives exist, even if they are
not offered by the provider. In other words, patients have a right to
expect honesty from those who treat them about all available choices.
Efforts to ensure that rape victims receive information about the
availability of emergency contraception as a means of pregnancy
prophylaxis have had mixed results. A number of states require hospitals to provide information about emergency contraceptives and/or
dispense the medication upon request to rape victims. 264 Professional
associations such as the AMA, American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, American Academy of Pediatrics, and American Public
Health Association have also adopted guidelines indicating that the

261. Although the courts must refrain from questioning the sincerity or plausibility of
religious beliefs, see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981), the issue here is not the validity of a belief that all contraception is morally wrong
or when life begins. Rather, the issue is whether a particular contraceptive has a postfertilization effect.
262. See Steve Chapman, For Those Who Believe in the Sanctity of Life, Why MorningAfter Pill Is Pro-Life and Not Abortion in Disguise, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 27;
see also SUSAN A. CROCKETT ET AL., HORMONE CONTRACEPTIVES CONTROVERSIES AND
CLARIFICATIONS (1999) (concluding that oral contraceptives do not cause failure of implantation of the fertilized egg), available at http://www.aaplog.org/decook.htm.
263. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN’S HEALTH POLICY FACTS, EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION 1-2 (2005) (citing results of a 2004 survey that thirty-six percent of
women denied knowledge of emergency contraception and a 2003 survey that seventy-five
percent of women in California did not know the difference between emergency contraceptives and RU-486), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/3344-03.pdf.
264. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.11(e)(1) (West 2006); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2
(2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 111, § 70E(o) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§2805p(2) (McKinney 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1350(b) (2003) (stating that if requested, a sexual assault victim must be provided “medication for pregnancy prevention”);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 322.004(b)(4), 322.005(2) (Vernon 2006) (providing
that facilities treating rape victims must inform them about the appropriateness and contraindications of medications prescribed to prevent pregnancy).
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medical standard of care is to advise rape victims about emergency
contraceptives. 265 The AMA’s guidelines provide:
Female patients must be counseled about options for pregnancy
prevention. If the physician has moral reservations about personally delivering this counseling, he or she is responsible to have
someone else inform the patient of her relative risk of pregnancy
and provide prophylaxis. Physicians are obligated to ensure that
sexual assault patients are properly informed of all risks and interventions to prevent conception as a result of the assault. 266

Yet recent surveys have shown that, despite state mandates and
the prevailing standard of care, many victims are not receiving this
information. 267 Very few situations involving the failure under state
law to provide information about emergency contraceptives to sexual
assault victims have been litigated. In one case, a California appellate court held that a Catholic hospital could be liable for malpractice
for failing to provide a rape victim with information about emergency
contraceptives, even though the refusal was based on religious
grounds. 268 Refusal laws allowing physicians to decline to counsel or
advise women on this option may only exacerbate the problem.
“Rights of conscience in health care must be exercised in the context
of patient rights to informed consent.” 269 Allowing silence about pregnancy prophylaxis effectively forces sexual assault victims and other
women to make decisions based on beliefs they may not share. 270

265. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Emergency Contraception, 116 PEDIATRICS 1026, 102
(2005) (stating that emergency contraceptives should be offered to rape or abuse victims
when the assault was within the past 72-120 hours); AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, POLICY
STATEMENT 29 (2003) (“Offering emergency contraception to sexual assault survivors at
risk
of
pregnancy
is
the
accepted
standard
of
care.”),
available
at
http://go2ec.org/pdfs/Endorsement_APHA_SexualAssault.pdf; Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin # 69, Emergency Contraception, 106 J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL & 1443, 1446 (2005) (recommending that emergency contraception be given to all
women who have had unprotected sexual intercourse and who do not desire pregnancy).
266. AM. MED. ASS’, STRATEGIES FOR THE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT 15 (1995), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/386/sexualassault.pdf
(footnote omitted).
267. See CATHOLICS FOR A F REE CHOICE, COMPLYING WITH THE L AW ? H OW
CATHOLIC H OSPITALS RESPOND TO S TATE LAWS MANDATING THE P ROVISION OF
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION TO SEXUAL ASSAULT PATIENTS 7-8 (2006),
http://www.cath4choice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/2006complyingwiththelaw.pdf.
268. Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242, 245 (1989).
In Brownfield, however, the plaintiff could not prove she suffered any damage as the result
of the denial of information and was not allowed to proceed on the claim. Id. at 245.
269. Thomas May, Rights of Conscience in Health Care, 27 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 111,
127 (2001).
270. The FDA’s recent approval of nonprescription status for Plan B may improve access, but it does not address the issue of pharmacist refusals to provide the drug on grounds
of conscience. There is no requirement that Plan B be stocked by pharmacies and, where
available, it must be kept behind the counter. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 10.
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D. Duty to Refer or Transfer
Once a relationship is established, the general rule is that a provider may not unilaterally sever the relationship without reasonable
notice or providing alternative care for a patient in need of continuing medical services. 271 If immediate treatment is indicated, which
the physician can not or will not provide, there is an obligation to refer or arrange care by another professional. 272 This obligation is not
obviated simply because there may be a conflict between the professional’s moral values and the patient’s desires. Where a denial or delay of care would cause suffering or serious harm to the patient, the
legal solution to the conflict is to refer or transfer the patient to another provider. Professional organizations also recognize the ethical
duty to maintain continuity of care when professionals decline to
participate in the provision of treatment to a patient. For instance,
the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual recommends that
if a physician and patient cannot resolve their differences on the
medical care to be pursued, the physician should consider transferring the patient to another caregiver. 273
Objections on grounds of conscience to this duty often concern the
question of moral complicity in enabling or facilitating an immoral
act. “To cooperate in an act which is regarded as inherently morally
wrong . . . is to be a moral accomplice.” 274 For example, if a physician
refuses to perform an elective abortion, she should not be required to
refer a patient to a physician who does because that makes her morally complicit in association with an evil. 275 Yet the law would not require referral in this instance. There is no duty to arrange for the as-

271. Grant v. Douglas Women’s Clinic, 580 S.E.2d 532, 533-35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that there was a fact issue on whether physician properly withdrew from case);
Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963) (stating that a physician should not
leave a patient needing treatment without giving reasonable notice or making arrangements for the attendance of another physician); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah
1937) (holding a physician liable for refusing to treat patient in need of care unless patient
paid previous account).
272. Norton v. Hamilton, 89 S.E.2d 809, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (holding physician liable in tort for abandoning woman in labor); Johnson, 370 S.W.2d at 597 (finding physician
liable for obstructing release of patient to another physician).
273. ACP, Ethics Manual, supra note 204, at 562.
274. Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 239. Some individuals have not been as eloquent as
Dr. Pellegrino in their objections to referring patients for moral reasons. Karen Brauer,
President of Pharmacists for Life International, is quoted as saying, “That’s like saying, ‘I
don’t kill people myself but let me tell you about the guy down the street who does.’ What’s
that saying? ‘I will not off your husband, but I know a buddy who will?’ It’s the same
thing.” Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005,
at A01.
275. Some pharmacists have argued that they should not be required to transfer prescriptions they object to filling. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. The concept of
moral cooperation would not seem to prohibit transferring information or records, however.
See Pellegrino, supra note 22, at 240.
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sumption of care by another provider where the patient will merely
be inconvenienced or will not suffer harm by the temporary refusal of
care. 276 Further, professionals are free to terminate care of patients
upon reasonable notice even if the patient requires continuing, but
nonemergent, care without a corresponding duty to find another physician. 277 The duty to transfer or refer arises where significant harm
will ensue if the patient is simply abandoned by the caregiver.
Relegating the provider’s obligations by transfer of care may not
always be the appropriate means to resolve conflicts between a provider’s conscience and the patient’s medical needs. In situations
where a patient’s condition does not permit transfer or where there is
no provider willing to assume care of the patient, another approach
to resolve patient-provider disputes may be necessary. Referral to
another professional should also not be a convenient excuse for
unlawful discrimination. Bioethicist Thomas May states:
[I]t is not clear that a policy of “transfer of care” is always acceptable, as it fails to consider adequately the reasons upon which a
right of conscience may appropriately be exercised, and the effect
of transfer of care on the patient’s access to care. Allowing “unlimited” rights of conscience through transfer of care leaves open the
possibility of discriminatory practices and transfer that is contrary
to the patient’s best interests. 278

1. End-of-Life Care
Today, we take for granted that individuals have the prerogative
to withdraw or withhold care if faced with a terminal or irreversible
illness. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional
underpinning of the right to refuse lifesaving treatment. 279 Despite
widespread support for this privilege, there are instances where hospitals and physicians decline to honor a patient’s end-of-life decision
whether expressed directly, through an advance directive, or by a
surrogate. This is a problem of special concern at Catholic-affiliated
institutions. Catholic teachings on the patient’s right to refuse life-

276. An abandonment claim sounds in negligence, and harm must be proved. See E.
Ala. Behavioral Med. v. Chancey, 883 So.2d 162, 172 (Ala. 2003) (finding no abandonment
where plaintiffs failed to allege any injury).
277. See Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that physician had no continuing legal obligation to provide outpatient renal dialysis to an
uncooperative patient after the physician gave her reasonable notice and an opportunity to
find another facility).
278. May, supra note 269, at 112. Another bioethicist, George Annas, has called the
transfer of persons refusing end-of-life treatment “ethical dumping.” George J. Annas, At
Law: Transferring the Ethical Hot Potato, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20, 21 (1987).
279. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing lifesustaining medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration).
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sustaining care, including the refusal or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, state that an institution “will not honor an advance directive that is contrary to Catholic teaching.” 280 There is also
a presumption favoring nutrition and hydration unless the burdens
of such outweigh the benefits to the patient. 281 Pope John Paul II injected some uncertainty into this issue in March 2004 when he announced that the administration of artificial hydration and nutrition
to a person in a persistent vegetative state is not a medical act. 282
The Pope’s comments led ethicists at the National Catholic Bioethics
Center to state that advance directives requesting the removal of nutrition and “hydration in cases of a persistent vegetative state, may
have to be reconsidered.” 283
However, it is not only Catholic physicians or hospitals that may
find it difficult to honor a patient’s request to withhold or withdraw
treatment. A recent survey of internists found that many were less
likely to agree to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration or antibiotics than other treatments, such as a ventilator or
dialysis. 284 In recognition of the different ethical perspectives in endof-life care, most advance directive laws allow providers to refuse to
follow the wishes of patients and their surrogates when to do so
would violate their professional or institutional conscience. 285 Unlike
the newer refusal laws, however, advance directive statutes generally expect providers to inform the patient of the conflict, to attempt
to resolve patient-provider disputes, and, if necessary, to transfer the
patient to another provider. Under Texas law, for example, if the
physician disagrees with the patient’s advance directive or treatment
decision, the matter must first be referred to an ethics committee for
resolution, with the opportunity for input from the patient or surro-

280. Ethical and Religious Directives, supra note 225, Directive 24.
281. Id., Directive 58.
282. Pope John Paul II, The Vatican, Address to the Participants in the International
Congress: Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas (Mar. 20, 2004), http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/
2004/march/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20040320_congress-fiamc_en.html. In Cruzan, artificial nutrition and hydration were assumed to be medical intervention. See 497 U.S. at 278.
283. Nat’l Catholic Bioethics Ctr., Statement of the NCBC on Pope John Paul II’s Address on Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in PVS (2004), http://www.ncbcenter.org/
04-04-23-NCBCStatementonNutritionandHydration.asp. The Vatican recently reaffirmed
its position that artificial nutrition and hydration are ordinary means of preserving life
and obligatory under most circumstances. The Vatican, Response to Certain Questions of
the United States Conferences of Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
(Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_
cfaith_doc_20070801_risposte-usa_en.html.
284. Neil J. Farber et al, Physicians’ Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw LifeSustaining Treatment, 166 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 560, 562 (2006).
285. See White, supra note 9, at 1721 (noting that a majority of states allow health care
providers to refuse to participate in withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining care).
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gate. 286 If the physician disagrees with the decision of the committee,
the physician and the facility must make an effort to transfer the patient to another caregiver that is willing to comply with the patient’s
request. 287 If a health professional does not comply with the statutory
provisions when refusing to honor the patient’s directive, the professional may be subject to disciplinary action or other civil remedies. 288
The courts have also been called upon to resolve disputes between
patients or their surrogates seeking to end life-sustaining care and
hospitals or professionals who conscientiously decline to participate
in the withholding or withdrawal of treatment. The lack of notice to a
patient of the provider’s religious or ethical policies has been an important factor in several cases. In Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great
Neck, Inc., the court concluded that the ethical objections of the facility were outweighed by the patient’s right to decline a feeding
tube. 289 The court stated:
[W]e find significant the fact that the defendants failed to make
the facility’s policy on the issue known to the Elbaum family until
after the family requested the removal of the gastrointestinal tube.
Thus, the Elbaum family had no reason to believe that Mrs. Elbaum was relinquishing her right of self-determination with regard to her medical care upon her admission to the facility. 290

The court ruled that if the parties were unable to effect the patient’s
transfer to another facility that would abide by her wishes, the hospital would be required to assist the patient by removing the tube or
permitting a physician selected by the patient’s family to carry out
her wishes at the hospital. 291
Similarly, in Gray v. Romeo, the hospital opposed removal of artificial nutrition and hydration from the patient, viewing such action
as “tantamount to euthanasia, inconsistent with the physician’s role
as safekeeper of his or her patient’s well being.” 292 The court held
that the patient had a constitutional right to refuse nutrition and
hydration and had not been notified upon entering the hospital that
she would be surrendering this privilege. 293 The hospital was ordered
to accede to her request unless she was promptly transferred to a facility that would respect her wishes. 294

286. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
287. § 166.046(d).
288. § 166.045(b).
289. 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
290. Id. at 848.
291. Id.
292. 697 F. Supp. 580, 583 (D.R.I. 1988).
293. Id. at 590.
294. Id. at 591; see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987), stay denied sub
nom., Lincoln Park Nursing and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987) (direct-
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Courts are willing to protect a health care provider’s right of conscience to refuse life-sustaining treatment where another provider is
willing to carry out the patient’s request. In Conservatorship of Morrison, physicians objected to the conservator’s request to remove a
nasogastric tube from a 90-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative
state. 295 The court concluded that the physicians should not be forced
to act against their beliefs where they were willing to transfer care to
another physician. “The prevailing viewpoint among medical ethicists appears to be that a physician has the right to refuse on personal moral grounds to follow a conservator’s direction to withhold
life-sustaining treatment, but must be willing to transfer the patient
to another physician who will follow the conservator’s direction.” 296
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to force the
hospital to remove a patient’s feeding tube over its ethical objections
and instead directed the hospital to assist the guardian in transferring the patient to another facility that was willing to end the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration. 297
Where transfer cannot be accomplished, either because no other
provider will accept the patient or the patient’s condition does not
warrant removal to another facility, several courts have held that the
patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining measures overrides the professional’s moral or ethical objection and that the provider must respect the patient’s wishes. 298 The New Jersey Supreme Court directed a nursing home that objected on moral grounds to withdrawal
of a gastrostomy tube from a patient who had resided there for six
years to honor a request to remove the tube rather than transferring
the patient. 299 The court recognized the burden it was placing on
nursing personnel but concluded that “to allow the nursing home to
discharge Mrs. Jobes if her family does not consent to continued artificial feeding would essentially frustrate Mrs. Jobe’s right of selfdetermination.” 300 In In re Requena, the trial court was faced with a
ing treatment over the nursing home’s objections where it did not inform the patient’s family of its policy about artificial feeding until they requested it be withdrawn).
295. 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
296. Id. at 534. The court left unanswered whether it would order the withdrawal of
treatment if the patient could not be transferred. “The issue of whether a court could compel physicians to act contrary to their ethical views is too profound for gratuitous discussion in a dictum. Its resolution must await an appropriate case.” Id. at 535.
297. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638-40 (Mass. 1986).
298. Courts have recognized that upholding the medical ethics of the profession is a
factor to weigh in determining if a patient’s right to withhold or refuse treatment may be
overridden. See Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 589. The ethics of the medical profession may differ
from the individual ethics or morals of the provider, however. “(C)onsideration of the integrity of medical ethics does not present a compelling justification to refuse Marcia Gray’s
wishes. Indeed, medical ethics incorporates the principle that the patient, not the health
care provider, determines what the course of care should be.”). Id.
299. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at 450.
300. Id.

2007]

HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE

827

request by a Catholic hospital to compel a patient dying of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis to leave the hospital because she refused artificial feeding. 301 Despite the hospital’s willingness to transfer the patient to another institution willing to accept her, the court declined to
order her removal because it would be “emotionally and psychologically upsetting to be forced to leave the Hospital.” 302 Both Jobes and
In re Requena preceded New Jersey’s and most other states’ advance
directive statutes. Under these laws, it would appear that only in exceptional circumstances would providers be faced with the prospect
of carrying out actions that conflict with their faith or ethics because
they are required on admission to give notice to patients of their policies and, if a conflict occurs later, permitted to transfer patients if
they cannot honor a patient’s directive. 303
These legal precedents affirm the principles that a health care facility or professional has a duty (1) to provide prior notice of its policies where they may conflict with the patient’s right to withhold or
withdraw treatment and (2) to assist in the transfer or referral of a
patient to another provider where a conflict ensues between the patient and the health care team that cannot be informally resolved.
Under the broad conscience clauses being proposed today, however,
patients or their families would seem to be left on their own if the
provider refused to honor a request or directive. Such legislation does
not require that the objecting physician or hospital transfer or refer a
patient in a terminal or irreversible condition whose refusal of care is
not honored. This omission contradicts case law, advance directive
statutes, and professional codes of ethics that recognize that in endof-life conflicts, health care providers are obliged to ensure continuity
of care, either through transferring the patient or, in rare circumstances if that cannot be accomplished, acceding to the patient’s or
surrogate’s requests. 304

301. 517 A.2d 886, 887-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986), aff’d, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
302. Id. at 889-90.
303. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65(b) (West 1996) (allowing a private, religiously affiliated institution to decline services if its policies are communicated to the patient either
on admission or as soon after as practical, and if a conflict cannot be resolved, effecting
“the appropriate, timely and respectful transfer of the patient to the care of another health
care institution appropriate to the patient’s needs”).
304. Even where an advance directive statute permits transfer, there may be difficult
and irresolvable situations where the patient cannot be transferred. See FLA. STAT. §
765.1105(2) (2006) (providing that a where a facility or professional is unwilling to carry out a
patient’s or surrogate’s decision, the provider must within seven days transfer the patient or,
if the patient is not transferred, carry out the wishes of the patient or surrogate).
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V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
Broad refusal laws prompt serious constitutional questions, as
well as raise the potential for conflict with many existing federal and
state laws. These concerns are grounded primarily in the failure of
these laws to consider the burden they place on patients and to provide reasonable accommodations for workplace disputes over morals
and the delivery of care.
A. The Establishment Clause
A detailed analysis of the Establishment Clause is beyond the
scope of this Article. Yet a brief discussion is in order because conscience laws illustrate the tension between the Religion Clauses: accommodations to relieve burdens on religious practices under the
Free Exercise Clause may not be permissible under the Establishment Clause. Although Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Establishment Clause has been described as “confused” 305 or “murky,” 306 a
few basic principles have emerged.
Legislative accommodations are reasonable and consistent with
the Establishment Clause when they have a secular purpose and do
not serve primarily to advance religion or foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 307 Courts also inquire whether the benefits
under the statute single out religion, are afforded to both religious
and nonreligious groups, or impose an undue burden on nonbeneficiaries. 308 The fact that a statute incidentally benefits religion or
makes an explicit reference to religion does not render it an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. 309 Two particular issues arise with
health conscience clauses under the endorsement test. First, as explained previously, recent proposals, with some exceptions, grant an
absolute accommodation to objecting providers. Second, benefits under health conscience clauses appear to be offered to a broad range of
personal beliefs.

305. Jamar, supra note 73, at 766.
306. Gey, supra note 67, at 533.
307. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
308. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (“Our decisions indicate that an
accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.”);
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11-13, 18 n.8 (1989) (addressing whether benefits
flow to nonreligious groups and whether the accommodation imposes a substantial burden
on nonbeneficiaries).
309. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722-23 (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in the face of an Establishment Clause challenge even
though religious beliefs were singled out for protection); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (stating
that statutes alleviating burdens on religious groups are not invalid simply because they
fail to afford similar benefits to secular entities).
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Although there is no clear line delineating when an accommodation turns into an impermissible advancement of religion, 310 the Supreme Court has warned that absolute accommodations for religion
are constitutionally intolerable. 311 In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., the Court struck down a Connecticut statute providing Sabbath
observers with an unqualified right not to work on the Sabbath. 312
The Court found that the statute violated the Establishment Clause
because it provided no exceptions and failed to give any consideration
to the burdens placed on employers and nonbeneficiaries. 313 “This
unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion
Clauses.” 314
Despite Thornton, it is unlikely that recent health conscience laws
violate the Establishment Clause. To invoke the First Amendment
prohibition on establishing religion, federal or state law must afford
preferential treatment to a religion or religions. 315 Although many of
the latest conscience clauses provide health care workers and entities
with an absolute right to refuse services, they do not single out religion for special treatment or endorse particular religious practices.
Mississippi’s statute and similar state proposals, with which this Article is primarily concerned, do not appear on their face to discriminate between religious beliefs and personal, moral, or ethical principles. 316 If the statutes are construed to encompass secular ethical or
moral refusals as well as religious conscientious objections, they are

310. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (“At some point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an
unlawful fostering of religion.’ ”) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987).
311. Some commentators have also expressed the view that statutes which require
employees to afford religious believers a heightened, but not absolute, level of accommodation beyond the de minimis level recognized in Title VII cases implicate the Establishment
Clause. See Gregory J. Gawlik, Note, The Politics of Religion: “Reasonable Accommodations” and the Establishment Clause An Analysis of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act,
47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 276 (1999) (arguing that the proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act borders on “absolute” accommodation and is suspect under the Establishment
Clause); Oleske, supra note 76, at 571 (noting that a heightened accommodation standard
under Title VII increases the risk it will be subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause). However, the Supreme Court recently found RLUIPA consistent with the Establishment Clause even though it required a “ ‘compelling governmental interest’ ” before
imposing a burden on prisoners’ religious exercise. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723.
312. 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985).
313. Id. at 709-10.
314. Id. at 710.
315. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11 (noting that a state’s award of unemployment
benefits to religious observers did not single out a class of persons for favorable treatment and did not endorse religion); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970)
(recognizing that where secular institutions are also granted an exemption, there is no
favoritism of religion).
316. See discussion supra Part III.C. On the other hand, Illinois’ conscience statute
recognizes a preference for religious refusals to render care. See supra note 111.
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unlikely to be forbidden under the Establishment Clause. 317 As Justice Harlan observed, “[a]s long as the breadth of exemption includes
groups that pursue cultural, moral or spiritual improvement in multifarious secular ways, including, I would suppose, groups whose
avowed tenets may be antitheological, atheistic, or agnostic, I can see
no lack of neutrality in extending the benefit of the exemption to organized religious groups.” 318 The converse is true as well. If the
courts interpret health conscience clauses as intending to protect
primarily beliefs arising out of religious traditions or tenets, they
could be viewed as endorsing religion, even if the law also benefits
secular beliefs. 319
B. Conflicts with Federal and State Laws
Although they may not be prohibited by the Establishment
Clause, broad conscience clauses that require absolute accommodation of health care conscientious objectors conflict with many federal
and state statutes. Title VII, for instance, mandates only reasonable
accommodation of employees’ religious beliefs and practices. Nevertheless, Title VII does not preempt state laws providing greater protection against employment discrimination. In California Federal
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court observed that
Congress disclaimed any intent to preempt state law or occupy the
field of employment discrimination law. 320 Title VII and other federal
statutes prohibiting discrimination preempt health care refusal laws
only if they directly conflict with the protections embedded in these
laws. 321 Rights of conscience would accordingly be inhibited by federal law proscribing provider discrimination against patients. 322
Conscience laws may also be attacked under state constitutions.
Most states have adopted open courts provisions in their constitu317. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73 (upholding property tax exemption accorded to religious institutions, in part, because the law granted an exemption to a broad range of nonprofit organizations); see also McConnell, supra note 67, at 699 (stating that the Establishment Clause is implicated “(o)nly if the benefits flow exclusively (or nearly so) to religious individuals or institutions”).
318. Walz, 397 U.S. at 697 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
319. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (finding a statute that authorized
a period of silence for meditation in public schools unconstitutional because the statute had
no purpose other than to return voluntary prayer to schools); see also Caldor, 472 U.S. at
711 (stating that statute was invalidated because it “singles out Sabbath observers for special . . . . protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees”) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
320. 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (finding that California statute giving greater rights to
pregnant workers was not preempted by Title VII because “Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent categorically to pre-empt state law or to ‘occupy the field’ of employment discrimination law”).
321. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2000); see also § 12201(b) (providing that the ADA does
not invalidate state laws providing equal or greater protection for disabled individuals).
322. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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tions, guaranteeing the right to judicial access in common law actions. 323 The open courts guarantee may be invoked to challenge a
conscience clause’s restriction of the right to seek a remedy in medical malpractice or other well-established causes of action. 324 Some
state courts have been willing to strike statutes that completely abrogate a right of access to the courts. 325 Legislation that abolishes a
remedy in civil actions only for patients harmed by religious or moral
refusals of treatment would seem particularly suspect under state
constitutional provisions.
Conflicts might also arise under state laws prohibiting discrimination against patients on the basis of their status, such as sexual
orientation. A case pending in the California Supreme Court, although not involving a conscience clause, demonstrates the tension
that may occur between health care rights of refusal and expansive
state discrimination laws. 326 After eleven months of fertility treatment at a San Diego clinic, the plaintiff, a lesbian, was denied intrauterine insemination (IUI). 327 She filed suit under a California
statute barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 328
The defendants asserted that they refused to perform IUI on plaintiff
not because of her sexual orientation, but because she was unmarried and that their conduct was justified by their right to the free exercise of religion under the state and federal Constitutions. 329 This
case illustrates the difference between a professional or facility conscientiously refusing to provide a specific treatment, such as abortion, and refusing to provide treatment due to a person’s status.
With respect to workplace disputes, courts may have to incorporate reasonable accommodation standards, even where none exists. 330
323. See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1309, 1310 (2003) (stating that forty state constitutions explicitly or implicitly recognize a
right of access to seek a remedy for civil wrongs).
324. Id. at 1312-13 (discussing use of the open courts provisions of state constitutions
to strike down impediments to judicial access).
325. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (Ariz. 1984) (finding unconstitutional a statute of limitations that barred an action for damages before it could reasonably
be discovered); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001) (holding that
the legislature may abolish a common law cause of action only if it provides a substitute remedy in the event of injury); see also Phillips, supra note 323, at 1335-39 (discussing various
approaches used by courts in addressing the remedies clause of state constitutions).
326. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County,
40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review granted and opinion superseded, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 605 (Cal. 2006).
327. Id. at. 638-41.
328. Id. at 638.
329. Id.
330. In several decisions, courts have engrafted the accommodation standard from Title VII onto state abortion conscience statutes or other laws which appeared on their face
to provide absolute protections for employees. See Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc.,
583 P.2d 860, 864 (Alaska 1978), vacated on other grounds on reh’g, 601 P.2d 584 (1979),
appeal dismissed sub nom., Lumber, Prod. & Indus. Workers Local 2362 v. Wondzell, 444
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Otherwise, pharmacies, hospitals, and other facilities may have a
duty to accommodate the personal, moral, or ethical beliefs of every
employee, resulting in potential disruptions in the delivery of health
care. In the end, a statutory scheme that provides no right of redress
for patients or regulatory bodies and no recourse for employers in the
face of health care refusals may prove to be unworkable as well as legally suspect.
VI. CONCLUSION
Conscience clauses raise many difficult issues in a pluralistic society. Health care providers have special obligations to patients that
are not replicated in many other professional endeavors. Duties prescribed by law and professional codes of conduct expect health care
providers to act out of respect for the patient’s welfare and dignity.
While no one suggests that health professionals should abandon
their religious or moral principles, patients should not suffer harm or
potential harm because of a belief they do not share. It is often appropriate to accommodate individuals who wish to exercise their
principles in the care of patients, but conscience clauses that promote
blanket immunity for refusals to provide health care services resolve
the tension between patient needs and provider autonomy in a onesided manner.
When health care providers deviate from standards of care, engage in unprofessional conduct, or unduly burden their colleagues
and employers through refusals to perform services, exemptions from
malpractice, disciplinary, or employment actions are not appropriate.
Patients should not be deprived of a right of redress through common
law claims; immunity from malpractice actions for conscientious objections elevates moral reasons for harming a patient over other reasons. Similarly, states have little interest in fostering unprofessional
conduct even where patient harm does not occur. Accordingly, legislators should not tie the hands of disciplinary boards in addressing
such conduct.
The clamor for absolute immunity from employment actions for
health care workers asserting moral refusals to treat demonstrates a
myopic view of the burdens imposed by such objections on patients,
employers, and coworkers. Despite protests to the contrary, the reU.S. 1040 (1980) (reading Title VII’s duty of reasonable accommodation into Alaska statute
that forbid discrimination by employers and labor unions); Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of
Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 1262, 1266-67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that statute which
provided that person refusing to participate in an abortion could not be disciplined or terminated was violated when nurse was demoted to part-time status after refusal; court
applied Title VII’s standard of accommodation even though statute included no reference
to accommodation).

2007]

HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE

833

quirement under Title VII or similar state laws for reasonable accommodation of health care employees has not been demonstrated to
be ineffective to safeguard their rights. While recognizing the religious and moral values of employees, the courts have rightly looked
askance at refusals to treat that endanger a patient’s health or safety
or wreak havoc on a hospital’s or other entity’s ability to deliver care.
Protections are in place to address adequately the refusal rights of
health care workers. Although legislators may choose to heighten
the de minimis accommodation standard under Title VII, abrogation of the undue hardship test is not warranted from either a policy or legal prospective.
As shown by recent conscience legislation, some politicians seem
to have forgotten that the overriding purpose of our health care system is to protect the health and safety of patients. The expansion of
refusal legislation to create immunity for health care providers who
refuse any service for almost any reason is cause for alarm. Conscience clauses fail to achieve a reasonable balance when they confer
a special benefit on those whose religious, moral, or ethical beliefs
compel them to deny health care while absolving them of the potentially harmful consequences of their choices. By refusing to participate in health care services, a provider “may have eased her own
conscience, but . . . neither benefited the society-at-large, the patient
nor the patient’s family.” 331

331. Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 234 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985).

